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Revengeance Taken:
Russian Active Measures and our
Entrenched Racial Divide
Erin Berhan*
Our racial divide has always been a national security threat. An
early observer of our American project, Alexis de Tocqueville,
wrote about this threat to our future union in “Democracy in
America,” learned by merely travelling the young nation thirty
years before our Civil War.1 Despite generations of societal and
legal evolution, our nation has not overcome the wounds and
disabilities that our racial divide left behind — now ripe for
modern security threats. In 2019, the United States Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence released Volume II of their years long
investigation into Russian Active Measures of interference with
our elections and democracy, referring to the effort as an
“information warfare campaign” designed to stoke “societal
division in the United States.”2 Our racial divide was the fault line
under attack in the Russian Active Measures campaign.
The Senate’s “integrated” recommendations avoided the critical
issue of proven vulnerability through our racial fault lines and
mainly offered that social media companies, citizens, and the
*
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1

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Bantam Classics, Random House
2004).
2
S. COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 116TH CONG., REP. ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES
CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION, VOLUME 2: RUSSIA’S USE OF
SOCIAL MEDIA WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS, at 78 [hereinafter Sen. Intel. Rep.].
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Executive Branch should simply self-regulate in face of this
national security threat. More critically, the Senate
recommendations mandated that any “approach” to guard
against this threat “must be rooted in protecting democratic
values, including the freedom of speech.”3
The weak Senate recommendations, coupled with the
unprecedented siege on the Capitol on January 6, 2021, require
an urgent review of the ways that our laws have disabled us from
properly analyzing the impact of race as a legal matter. Three
landmark cases, Brandenburg v. Ohio, Washington v. Davis, and
McCleskey v. Kemp, are all post-Civil Rights Movement cases that
opened America up to assaultive speech, attempting to usher in
race-neutrality and a “law and economics” framework. These
cases made our racial lines a bit deeper, leaving us with scar
tissue exposed to the world, rather than sound and protective case
law.
Indeed, the landmark Brandenburg opinion supports this
argument.4 Clarence Brandenburg, who spoke his works a few
days after the Civil Rights Bill of 1964 was passed in the Senate,
threatened to march the Klan to Mississippi and St. Augustine,
Florida. There was nothing random about those locations.
Brandenburg spoke a few days after three young Civil Rights
workers were murdered by the Ku Klux Klan in the infamous
Mississippi Burning case, their bodies were still missing when he
spoke. Then-President Lyndon B. Johnson sent the F.B.I. and
troops to Mississippi as a response — the murders gripped the
nation and our government. Clarence Brandenburg also spoke
while widespread violence engulfed St. Augustine, Florida as Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. was spending the month in St. Augustine
to desegregate the city — violence was ongoing and rampant. Yet
this context was sanitized in a hastily written per curium opinion
originally authored by Abe Fortas as he was forced to resign over
financial improprieties. Adding to this uniquely odd circumstance,
no opinions were released on Brandenburg in the state courts
below. This acontextual, ahistorical opinion, stripped of the
power of judicial speech, is ironically our landmark Free Speech
3
4

Id.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969).
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decision. The Davis and McCleskey opinions warrant review as
the Senate was not short on data, facts, or intent in the Russian
Active Measures campaign report, yet somehow the data on race
was not acted upon nor appeared in the recommendations. These
cases frame why when our racial division is at the forefront of an
issue factually, it is disabled as a legal matter.
Demanding attention to where the law has failed us on matters of
race is fiercely important now as the relevant matters of national
security uncovered by the Senate remained unanswered legally.
Indeed, the January 6, 2021 “Save America” rally is eerily
reminiscent of Clarence Brandenburg’s exhortation to “Save
America” in his Klan speech in 1964. The studied blindness of
racism and racial harms in law has not solved our problems,
rather, it has left us more vulnerable than ever.
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INTRODUCTION
Part I of this paper identifies the premium national security held in the
formation of the United States of America and reveals how racial
imbalance was factored into the union to bolster national security and unity
at our founding. Silence was often a strategy to limit critique, leaving us
with deep divisions rampant today. Part II brings this threat to today,
discussing key revelations by the Senate Intelligence Committee on the
exploitation of the American legacy of racial division in the Russian
Active Measures Campaign. The facts presented by the Senate contrast
with the glaring void in the coordinating recommendations to mitigate the
stoking of racial divisions through divisive, racially-based speech. This
issue of race was also missing as an actionable legal matter in Robert
Muller’s indictment of the Russian defendants. This reveals our legal
disability — racism even when at the forefront factually remains enfeebled
legally. Further, that Bob Mueller was one of the two named defendants
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a case that ostensibly made race an almost fatal,
implausible matter legally, questions whether he was the best person to
analyze and indict persons involved in attacking our democracy through
our racial fault lines. Part III examines the validity of modern First
Amendment protections as our Senate positioned that no
recommendations to protect our democracy from the current “warfare” can
collide with current First Amendment protections. This paper analyzes the
unusual shift in early First Amendment doctrine which focused on
Communist party participation within the United States to a stark shift
post-Civil Rights movement in the landmark Brandenburg decision. The
sanitizing of Clarence Brandenburg’s unmistakably particularized speech
as Klan violence peaked during the Freedom Summer of 1964, coupled
with the analogizing Brandenburg to cases on Communist Party activity
should have pointed to distinguishing legal features, not relevant,
applicable case law. Further, the unusual circumstances in the ouster of
Justice Abe Fortas as he rushed to author the opinion —submitting it the
day before his official resignation— and the lack of any written opinions
through the lower courts warrant reassessment of the Brandenburg test.
Part IV claims that our disability to soundly analyze racial issues as a
matter of law goes far beyond Brandenburg. An analysis of two landmark
cases on race, Washington v. Davis and McCleskey v. Kemp, urge
additional reckoning as those cases broadly support the narrative of race
as a legally irrelevant matter through the use of shockingly obsolete,
discriminatory, and callous inputs, and a refusal to accept sophisticated
and reliable empirical data on race by the Court. Both issues are relevant
to understand how, faced with so much expert testimony, details, and facts
on race-baiting, the Senate glossed over the issues. In conclusion, Part V
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addresses the relevance now, urging a reimagining of the proper place of
race in our laws as a necessary response to the United States Senate’s
Select Committee on Intelligence investigation and report on Russia
Active Measures in the 2016 Election.

I: THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL SECURITY, & RACE
Our nation has always been complicated. After gaining independence
in the 1770s, the United States was not initially well suited to defend itself
from foreign influence, and skirmishes between individual states. These
threats required action to unify the people and states to guarantee the
fledgling nation’s future.5 National defense was therefore the lead
argument in the Federalist Papers — less romantic notions of democracy
heralded today, but more “arguments about defense . . . and geography at
its borders.”6 National defense as a unifier was not a new concept as
England was openly envied for enjoying a unique “insular situation,” a
geostrategic benefit serving as a natural guard against foreign invasion.7
This energy towards national security as the backbone of the Union was
the central theme in George Washington’s farewell address to the nation
at the end of his second presidential term in 1796. Washington, perhaps
more than any, was able to identify geographic concerns on foreign
invasion, yet he chose to warn against discreet foreign influence.8
Washington warned against “the insidious wiles of foreign influence
[requiring] a free people [] to be constantly awake . . . [as] foreign
influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.”9 He
imparted that “every part of our country [has an] interest in union”
specifically because of the “greater security from external danger [and] a
less frequent interruption [of our] peace by foreign nations.”10 Washington
was fearful enough to counsel that even commerce managed with anything
5
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION A BIOGRAPHY, 46-47 (Random House
2005).
6
Id. at 46 (discussing that the Federalist Papers 1-6 and 8-9, chiefly focused on national
security and the new United States were reprinted more than any of the other essays,
speaking to unity to provide national defense as the core logic politically, and of the voting
population for ratification of the new United States Constitution).
7
Id. at 47 (addressing an argument advanced by William Blackstone in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, incorporated into Federalist Papers No.’s 8, 41).
8
George Washington, September 17, 1796, Farewell Address, UNITED STATES SENATE
HISTORICAL OFFICE.
9
Id.
10
Id. (imparting this specially as the advice of “an old and affectionate friend”
counseling that this is central logic for a strong nation, and continually warning of the
various methods that “mischiefs of foreign intrigue” could do to the security of the United
States).
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less than an absolute “equal and impartial hand” could invite an
appearance of favoritism that would be “[paid] with a portion of [our]
independence.”11 The word “foreign” appears fifteen times in this speech,
“secure” and “security” nine, which together, is significantly higher than
the six references to the Constitution12 thus supporting the claim that
national security was the driver of our national project, and communicated
to citizens at large.
Washington also addressed slavery, but as in the Constitution, without
naming or defining it. Washington’s reminded the nation that the “North,
in an unrestrained intercourse with the South, protected by the equal laws
of a common government, finds in the production of the latter great
additional resources . . . and precious materials of manufacturing
industry . . . [as] the South . . . sees its agriculture grow and its commerce
expand.”13 The clear implication is that the slave-based industry of the
South created a useful and critical economic bond with the North that the
young Nation needed to thrive. The regions decided to bind themselves
legally in this symbiotic relationship. This bond-benefit dichotomy
received a parallel but more frank analysis by Thurgood Marshall, who
wrote of the same “clear understanding” and reliance as “[t]he economic
interests of the regions coalesced.”14 Marshall commented that despite the
“clear understanding of the role slavery would play in the new republic,
use of the words ‘slaves’ and ‘slavery’ was carefully avoided.”15 He gave
color to George Washington’s sanitized North-South mutual relationship
discussion noting that “New Englanders engaged in the ‘carrying trade’
would profit from transporting slaves from Africa as well as goods
produced in America by slave labor.”16 The economic and national
security advantages that racial inequities gave this country led to a
particular narrative on race — silence on the harms while advocating the
fruitfulness of national bonds.
11

Id.
Id. (referencing the Constitution six times).
13
Id. Beyond the North-South economic bond that relied upon slavery and laws
permitting slavery Washington also spoke about trade between the East, which provided
“indispensable outlets” for the production of the West created “an indissoluble community
of interest as one nation.” As territories to the West become more prevalent, the question
of free states versus slave states would embroil the nation. Id.
14
Thurgood Marshall, Commentary: Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, 26 VAL. U.L. REV. 21, 22 (1991) (stating in more open but wholly parallel
terms, that “[t]he economic interests of the regions coalesced). And as the words foreign,
secure, and security, pepper Washington’s farewell address without mention to slaves or
race. See also Amar, supra note 5, at 20 (“many of the Constitutions clauses specially
accommodated or actually strengthened slavery, although the word itself appeared nowhere
in the document”).
15
Marshall, supra note 14.
16
Id.
12
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Washington warned that ever-present “geographical discriminations”
undergirding factions and party alliances are highly divisive and are
“inseparable from our nature [with] root[s] in the strongest passions of the
human mind.”17 That is poetic, but the rest of the world was not so blind
to our passionate factions. Alexis de Tocqueville, a French aristocrat with
a judicial post in Versailles, traveled America from 1831-1832 to study
the then-new concept of a democratic government.18 De Tocqueville
identified that the diversity of people did not lend itself to an easy
American union, particularly given the unique issue of race in America.
Ventilating the blind spots in Washington’s farewell address, de
Tocqueville wrote:
[w]hatever faith I may have in the perfectibility of man, until human
nature is altered . . . a government [cannot] hold together forty different
peoples, disseminated over a territory equal to one-half of Europe . . .
avoid all rivalry, ambition, and struggles between them and direct their
independent activity to the accomplishment of the same design.”19
Even assuming “no hostile interests” and that all people could be
“equally interested in the maintenance of the Union,” de Tocqueville
wrote “I am still of the opinion that where there are 100,000,000 of men,
and forty distinct nations [states and territories] the continuance of the
Federal Government can only be a fortunate accident.”20 The United States
entered the Civil War thirty years later.
Seeing the inevitable end of slavery, de Tocqueville argued that
“[w]hatever efforts of the Americans of the south to maintain slavery, they
will not always succeed; slavery . . . which is now contrasted with
democratic liberties and the information of our age, cannot survive” and
yet “great calamities may be expected to ensue” upon any method used to
alter the entrenched racial dynamics.21 Agreeing with Thurgood Marshall
and George Washington on coalesced interests, de Tocqueville went
further. Slavery did not:
render the interests of one part of the Union contrary to those of
another part . . . it has modified the character and changed the habits of
the natives of the South . . . .[the] men who inhabit the vast territory of the
United States are almost all the issue of a common stock; but the effects of
the climate, and more especially of slavery, have gradually introduced
very striking differences.”22
17

Washington, supra note 8.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 17.
19
Id. at 461. The title of this chapter, was, in part, “DANGERS OF THE UNION RESULTING
FROM THE DIFFERENT CHARACTERS AND PASSIONS OF ITS CITIZENS.” Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 441.
22
Id. at 457.
18
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Moreover, it was not only the effects of our racial problems on Black
people, de Tocqueville discussed the effects on white Americans at length.
It was not the mere, general “diversity of interests or of opinions” creating
“[t]he dangers which threaten the American Union . . . but [] the various
characters and passions of the Americans” created by participating and
relying upon the slave trade and relying upon racial inequity to sustain the
nation.23 These observations are key in examinaning the scope and depth
of our racial divisions as a threat to modern national security, particularly
as they are written from the vantage point of a diligent outside observer,
who was interested in understanding the fault lines at play.

II. 2019 SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REPORT: FREE SPEECH
OVER NATIONAL SECURITY
The threats de Tocqueville mentioned almost two hundred years ago
was the foundation of the Russian Interference Campaign that dominated
the political landscape at the change of administrations in 2017. On August
18, 2020, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released its
fifth and final volume on its three-year bipartisan investigation into the
claims of Russian interference with the 2016 election, and the “American
political system” generally.24 This paper focuses on Volume 2: Russia’s
Use of Social Media released on October 8, 201925 as it identifies the risks
associated with First Amendment freedom of speech and our well-known
racial divisions.
The Senate Intelligence Committee claimed that their findings
revealed more than “active measures” but rather an “information warfare
campaign [that] was broad in scope and entailed objectives beyond the
23

Id. at 457-459. De Tocqueville would claim the following, which can relate to the
intractable nature of racial divisions specifically at moments where advances in Civil
Rights were emerging: “The citizen of the Southern States of the Union is invested with a
sort of domestic dictatorship, from his earliest years; the first notion he acquires in life is
that he is born to command, and the first habit which he contracts is that of being obeyed
without resistance.” Id. This speaks to the incredible violence discussed in Section III in
Brandenburg during the Civil Rights “Freedom Summer” and the recalcitrance of race and
its effects today.
24
Press Release, Senate Intelligence Committee, Senate Intel Releases Volume 5 of
Bipartisan Russia Report (August 18, 2020), (adding that “[t]he Committee’s investigation
totaled more than three years of investigative activity, more than 200 witness interviews,
and more than a million pages of reviewed documents. All five volumes total more than
1300 pages”) (Volume I: Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure; Volume II:
Russia’s Use of Social Media; Volume III: U.S. Government Response to Russian
Activities; Volume IV: Review of the Intelligence Community Assessment (followed by
Additional declassifications of Volume IV); and Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and
Vulnerabilities).
25
See Sen. Intel. Rep., supra note 2.
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result of the 2016 presidential election.”26 The efforts did not constrain
themselves merely to “harm Hillary Clinton’s chances of success and
supporting Donald Trump at the direction of the Kremlin” but that the
Kremlin “‘after election day . . . stepped on the gas . . . [and] became more
active . . . confirming again that the assault on our democratic process is
much bigger than the attack on a single election.”27 The Senate Intelligence
Committee took pains to cite a broad, sophisticated, and ongoing “warfare
campaign . . . vastly more complex and strategic . . . than was initially
understood.”28
While racial division was not the only target, it was dominant. The
findings confirmed that the “preponderance of the operational focus,
reflected repeatedly . . . was on socially divisive issues, such as race,
immigration, and Second Amendment rights—in an attempt to pit
Americans against one another and against their government.”29 The
Intelligence Report was not shy to claim racial divisions were a controlling
issue: “[b]y far, race and related issues were the preferred target of the
information [] campaign” and “[the] overwhelming operational emphasis
on race” combined with geographical targeting was central to the
methodology.30
Striking as that may be, how to approach this “warfare” given our
current laws is another matter. Divisions were not created by an adversary;
they were exploited. Thomas Rid, then Professor of Securities Studies at
Kings College, London, was one expert called to testify before the Senate,
and advised that “[t]he tried and tested way of active measures is to use an
adversary’s existing weaknesses against himself, to drive wedges into preexisting cracks: the more polarized a society, the more vulnerable it is—
America in 2016 was highly polarized.”31 Exploitation however needs
breath. It is the “institutions and norms that define western liberal
democracies . . . vibrant press freedoms, freedom of speech, and diverse
26

Id. at 4.
Id. at 4, 8.
28
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
29
Id. at 6. The Senate Select Committee did not link divisions stoked over immigration
to race, but the commentary used on immigration at events that the Senate claimed Russia
had a hand in organizing, were infused with racial invective, and should be considered as
a focus on race in this Report. Id.
30
Id. at 5-6. Proportionality was confirmed as the mainstream social media companies
shared their data as evidence for the Senate; Facebook revealed that over 66 percent of the
advertising content “contained a term related to race and targeting [] principally aimed at
African-Americans in key metropolitan areas”; also stating that Instagram and Twitter are
“heavily focused on hot-button issues with racial undertones”, and that “96 percent of the
IRA’s YouTube content was targeted at racial issues and police brutality.” Id. at 38-39.
31
Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns:
Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intel., 115th Cong. 6 (2017) (statement of Thomas
Rid, Professor Department of War Studies) [hereinafter Disinformation Hearing].
27
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societies” that are also conducive to exploitation.32 Rid, as many who
testified, explained that the 2016 election was a fungible target. The
Report confirmed that the focus would not end with the 2016 election,
“[i]t’s much more than that. It’s interference in our society, in our culture,
in our political conversation.”33

New Legal Terrain
While the Senate revealed the campaign intended to interfere “in our
society, in our culture, in our political conversation,”34 how to combat this
is issue is an unknown, and unchartered legal terrain. There were no armed
attacks, no “destruction of infrastructure,” nor a cyber-attack so severe to
fall under the use of force according to the United Nations.35 Russian
interference as claimed by the Senate Report therefore sits in a new legal
space between traditional information collection, but falls well under
traditional, physical attacks, thereby “push[ing] the boundaries of
international law.”36
Despite the severity and complexity of the active measures claims, and
no international law to provide guidance, the Senate’s recommendations
were vague and rudderless in what could be addressed — race baiting
speech. The concluding “Recommendations” section led with an
overarching precatory command that any remedy “must be rooted in
protecting democratic values, including freedom of speech” while
“defending against foreign influence.”37 Remarkably, the Senate then
stated that the Federal Government, civil society, and the private sector
“each have an important role to play in deterring and defending against

32

Sen. Intel. Rep., supra note 2, at 22; see Disinformation Hearing, supra note 41, at 6
(“Sometimes I am amazed how easy it is to play these games,” said the KGB’s grandmaster
of “dezinformatsiya”, General Ivan Agayants, during an inspection of the particularly
aggressive active measures shop in Prague in 1965, “if they did not have press freedom,
we would have to invent it for them”).
33
Id. at 37-38. Locational targeting had an additional efficiency — our geographically
based electoral system. Roughly one-third of locational targeting was directed at swing
states. Id.
34
Id.
35
Darin E. W. Johnson, Russian Election Interference and Race-Baiting, 9 COLUM. J.
RACE & L. 191, 241 (2019)(citing the OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 997 (2015)).
36
Id.
37
Sen. Intel. Rep., supra note 2, at 78. It is noteworthy that the Sen. Intel. Comm. Report
commences its recommendations in this manner given the hearings of Thomas Rid, who
shared a quote from a leading disinformation agent back in 1965 that “if they [Western
nations] did not have press freedom, we would have to invent it for them” regarding
feasibility of this method. The message seems to have had no effect. Disinformation
Hearing, supra note 41
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foreign influence operations that target the United States.”38 That the
public at large and the private sector should spontaneously guard the
nation against this sophisticated attack is illogical. The key conclusions
of the Senate report were that our society is at risk because of these attacks,
society has been duly affected, yet our society should spontaneously selfcorrect after being exposed to these intentionally hateful, divisive
messages.
The recommendations were weak.39 The Senate advised the social
media industry to simply self-regulate and share information to defend
against this sophisticated, broad, “warfare campaign” against the United
States.40 Sharing of “indicators” that were admittedly “ad-hoc” was
offered as a good starting point based on trials among certain companies;
basic notifications to users to warn that the content viewed may have a
malicious nature were proffered.41 The Committee suggested that
Congress should “consider ways to facilitate productive coordination”
between the social media industry and the pertinent government agencies
and departments” regarding foreign influence operations against
Americans.42 While the latter is more promising as Congress may pass
laws, there was no timeline, no assigning this awesome task to an
administrative agency, it was a simple suggestion.
The Executive Branch recommendations were particularly stunning:
“The Committee recommends . . . [that] in the run up to the 2020 election,
[the Executive Branch should] reinforce with the public the danger of
attempted foreign influence in the 2020 election.”43 This recommendation
came a few months after then-President Donald Trump sat for a highly
publicized interview with George Stephanopoulos in the Oval Office,
claiming that if offered, he might accept “dirt” on a rival from a foreign
government, stating: “It’s not interference. They have information. I think
I’d take it.”44 The Stephanopoulos interview pressed upon the June 2016
38

Sen. Intel. Rep., supra note 2, at 78.
Id. at 78-85 (beginning the recommendations with industry-related guidance, then
Congressional measures, followed by recommendations to the Executive Branch, ending
with “Other Measures” and other “additional views” submitted independently by Senator
Wyden (D-OR)).
40
The Committee recommends that social media companies work to facilitate greater
information sharing between the public and private sector, and among . . . themselves about
malicious activity . . . Formalized mechanisms . . . to defend against foreign
disinformation, as occurred with violent extremis content online, should be fostered.” Sen.
Intel. Rep., supra note 2, at 78.
41
Id. at 79.
42
Id. at 80.
43
Id. at 81.
44
Jessica Taylor, Trump: If Offered Dirt By Foreign Government On 2020 Rival, ‘I
Think I’d Take It’, NPR (June 12, 2019).
39
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meetings between Russians and the Trump team, one of the very reasons
the Senate commenced this investigation.
Another ineffective recommendation was to “build media literacy
from an early age [to] help build long-term resilience to foreign
manipulation of our democracy.”45 This recommendation both admits that
this threat will remain for years to come, and that not only do we lack
requisite defenses today, but that we may lack defenses
intergenerationally. The final “Other Measures” recommended were not
any more reassuring, suggesting that “public figures engaged in political
discourse . . . be judicious in scrutinizing the information that they choose
to share or promote online.”46 Despite this report being developed by the
Senate Intelligence Committee, the concluding recommendation seemed
to reject duty of that intelligence role, encouraging that “all Americans . . .
[take] responsibility . . . to not give greater reach to those who seek to do
our country harm.”47
The Senate appeared to have punted on our national security “warfare”
vulnerability. Certainly, Americans cannot spontaneously, and without
leadership or coordination, successfully combat a broad attack. The
American Bar Association’s International Law division 2018 Year in
Review lead issue were that “[t]ensions between the United States and
Russia” were high and included “frequent and tumultuous changes in
2018.”48 Nestled between a recap of the Treasury Department’s “Blocked
Persons” list, including “oligarchs . . . senior Russian Government
officials, and a state-owned Russian weapons trading company” and U.S.
Government’s “actions against Russia for its alleged involvement in the
nerve-agent attack” in the United Kingdom is an update to the indictments
of the Department of Justice for those involved in the Russian interference
in the 2016 presidential election.”49 The actors and the intent behind the
threat were known to be significant, requiring more than American citizens
to self-regulate.
The severity of this issue, combined with the challenging limits of
international law, should force an analysis of our domestic legal structures
and case law to develop a framework, determine solutions, and understand
what could provide better long-term protections for our “democratic
values, including the freedom of speech.”50

45
46
47
48
49
50

Sen. Intel. Rep., supra note 2, at 81.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Geoffrey M. Goodale , et al., National Security Law, 53 INT’l LAW 439, 439 (2019).
Id. at 440.
Sen. Intel. Rep., supra note 2, at 78.
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Race: The Missing Claim in the 2018 Indictment of Russian Agents
and the IRA
Robert Mueller III, acting as the Special Counsel for the Department
of Justice, submitted an indictment against the IRA (Internet Research
Organization – the group claimed to be the machine behind social media
meddling) and twelve other named defendants in 2018.51 There were eight
official counts:
Count 1 “conspiracy to defraud the United States”, Count 2 and
Counts 3-8 “aggravated identity theft”.52 Charges including conspiracy “to
defraud the United States by impairing, and defeating the lawful functions
of the government,” use of stolen ID’s53, a “strategic goal to sow discord
in the U.S. political system, including the 2016 U.S. presidential election,
obstruction via “fraud and deceit” by campaign expenditures without
“proper regulatory disclosure” and lack of registration as foreign agents54,
general organization of the group55 and conspiracy to commit wire and
bank fraud.56
Mueller’s claims generally point to traditional issues of foreign
influence, physical breaches, conspiracy to defraud, and identity theft. The
“Object of the conspiracy” charge was mechanical — opening of bank
accounts to support social media posts, and activities requiring financing.57
But the content and purpose of that conspiracy — divisive racial speech
— was touched on for context but had no legal effect. The indictment
rested upon the illegality of the fraudulent bank account activity and
identity theft as the method of attacking the United States on race — not
on the inflaming of racial divisions itself.
51
Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency, LLC, No. 1:18-cr-00032DFL, 2018 WL 91477 (D.D.C. Feb 16, 2018) [hereinafter “Indictment”].
52
Id.
53
Id. at 16 (claiming that “Defendants and their co-conspirators also used, possessed,
and transferred, without lawful authority, the social security numbers and dates of birth of
real U.S. persons . . . opened accounts at PayPal, a digital payment service provider;
created false means of identification, including fake driver’s licenses . . . [and] obtained,
and attempted to obtain, false identification documents to use as proof of identity in
connection with maintaining accounts and purchasing advertisements on social media
sites.”).
54
Id. (stating that the charges included abuse by the named defendants of “FARA” the
Foreign Registration Act which a kind of honor system for foreign agents of all stripes
which “establishes a registration, reporting, and disclosure regime for agents of foreign
principals (which includes foreign non-government individuals and entities) so that the
U.S. government and the people of the United States are informed of the source of
information and the identity of persons attempting to influence U.S. public opinion, policy,
and law.”).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 30.
57
Id. at 31.
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The words “race” and “racial” are not present in the indictment. Yet,
the implications exist and are striking. Black people and Muslim people
are referenced 19 times in the inditement and targeted with specificity —
such as encouraging Black people to not vote58 and using a two-pronged
approach for Muslim Americans, hiring persons to hold polarizing signs
at multiple rallies “depicting Clinton and a quote attributed to her stating
‘I think Sharia Law will be a powerful new direction of freedom.’”59 Then
online, promoting a second message of voter suppression aimed at
Muslim-Americans: “American Muslims [are] boycotting elections today,
most of the American Muslim voters refuse to vote for Hillary Clinton
because she wants to continue the war on Muslims in the middle east and
voted yes for invading Iraq.”60
Conversely, white-Americans are not referenced directly in the
Indictment (nor in the Senate Intelligence Report) but swept under the
ambit of “geographic regions” with groups called “South United” and
“Heart of Texas.”61 The geographic targeting claims focused on creating
live rallies in Florida under a series of rallies called “Florida goes
Trump”62 and in Pennsylvania in a series of rallies called “Miners for
Trump.”63 At these rallies, while economic sympathy specific to local
concerns was expressed (ie. miners in Pennsylvania), race was a loud and
unmistakable undercurrent in both the Pennsylvania64 and Florida65 series
58
Id. Cites to political ads stating, “Hillary Clinton Doesn’t Deserve the Black Vote,”
posts under the account “Woke Blacks” reading “[A] particular hype and hatred for Trump
is misleading the people and forcing Blacks to vote Killary. We cannot resort to the lesser
of two devils. Then we’d surely be better off without voting AT ALL,” or attempting to
point the Black vote to Jill Stein. Id. at 18, 20.
59
Id. at 21, 25.
60
Id. at 18.
61
Id. at 14.
62
Id. at 26 (one defendant having written “So we’re gonna organize a flash mob across
Florida to support Mr. Trump”).
63
Id. at 30.
64
See Donald Trump, Presidential Candidate, Campaign Speech in Manheim,
Pennsylvania (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?416260-1/donald-trumpcampaigns-manheim-pennsylvania (addressing Mexico at 01:36, “We are going to start
benfitting our country. Right now it is a one-way road to trouble. Our jobs leave us. Our
money leaves us. With Mexico, we get the drugs. They get the cash. That simple. [Cheers].
And we will build the wall.”) (addressing Islam at 45:42, “We are going to keep radical
Islamic terrorists out of our Country. Hillary wants to let them come [here] again, we
cannot do that . . . We are going to end illegal immigration [applause]”).
65
See Donald Trump, Presidential Candidate, Campaign Rally in Melbourne, Florida
(Sep. 27, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?415934-1/donald-trump-campaignsmelbourne-florida (addressing Islam at 17:39 and 58:04, “Radical Islamic terrorism (sic)
is spreading everywhere . . . We have a president who won’t even issue the term. We have
a former secretary of state who doesn’t want to mention the term. They’re allowing people
to come into our country by the thousands and thousands and thousands and we don’t even
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of rallies. While disparaging and enflamed speech about racial or religious
minorities may be distasteful and dangerous, it is unfortunately not illegal.
Mueller could only indict defendants for illegal funds that supported these
attacks.
Conversely, Mueller’s indictment cites to a panoply of laws such as
18 U.S.C. § 371, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, which
according to the Department of Justice is broad and not only “reaches
financial or property loss through use of a scheme or artifice . . . but [] is
designed and intended to protect the integrity of the United States and its
agencies, programs and policies” with substantial case law upholding the
protections for the government.66 Mueller issued charges of aggravated
identify theft, codified under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c) for indictment
purposes.67 Remedies available to the government for a broad range of
fraudulent securities claims were also included as part of the indictment.68
Additionally, the Indictment referenced various administrative agencies
whose rules were violated as per the indictment. For example, the FEC
(Federal Election Commission) rules on foreign contributions to election
communications, FARA (Foreign Registration Act) managed by the DOJ
(Department of Justice) requiring foreign agents to register and advise the
United States government of activities, and finally the U.S. Department of
State as to requirements of truthful statements to obtain a visa.69
The awesome weight and protection of these Federal laws and
agencies is in stark contrast to the absence of protections against racially
divisive speech. Indeed, it was not that the defendants prodded at our
racial fault lines that was a legal issue, it was only how they did it. That
the Special Counsel could only indict on technicalities like bank fraud and
identity theft, rather than indict directly on the attack on our racial
divisions as a proxy attack our society at large, requires an examination of
know who the hell they are [crowd boos]” . . . “We’re going to keep radical Islamic
terrorists the hell out of our country, OK? [crowd jeers]”) (addressing Mexico at 24:24,
“It’s a one-way highway right into Mexico, with our jobs and our money. I always say we
get the drugs they get the money”) (addressing immigration at 57:54, “We’re going to end
illegal and very dangerous immigration [large applause]”); see also Donald Trump,
Presidential Candidate, Campaign Rally in Tampa, Florida (Nov. 5, 2016), (addressing
immigration at 38:51, “Very quickly. We will stop illegal immigration, deport every last
criminal alien, and dismantle every criminal gang and cartel threatening our great citizens
[crowd roars]”).
66
18 U.S.C. § 371
67
Indictment, supra note 51, at 34-35.
68
Id. at 35-36 (noting 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) provide that
upon conviction, the defendants “shall forfeit to the United States any property, real or
personal . . . derived from proceeds traceable to the offense(s) of the conviction.” And if
any of that traceable property has been lost, damaged, placed beyond jurisdiction, etc., the
United States intended to “seek forfeiture of any other property of said defendant.”).
69
Id. at 11-12.
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the laws that created this disability that we will address in sections III and
IV.

Robert Mueller, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and Obviating Race in Modern
Law
It is interesting to note that Robert Mueller himself has had a role in
obviating race as a legal matter. Mueller, as former head of the F.B.I., was
one of two named defendants in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a case brought by a
former Pakistani immigrant-detainee for the malicious, harsh, and
discriminatory detainment he endured after 9/11.70 Iqbal’s complaint
alleged that Mueller was “‘instrumental’ in adopting and executing . . . ‘a
policy [of abusive confinement] solely on account of [] religion, race,
and/or national origin.”71 Iqbal’s claims were not rejected by the Court “on
the ground that they [were] unrealistic or nonsensical” nor had an
“extravagantly fanciful nature, [which would] disentitle them to the
presumption of the truth.”72 In writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
asserted that there was an “obvious alternative explanation”73 to claims of
racial animus — sometimes these incidents are an understood incident of
your race.. Kennedy wrote the “September 11 attacks were perpetrated by
19 Arab Muslim hijackers [led and composed of] Arab Muslim[s]. . . .
[thus] [i]t should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy . . . would
produce a disparate, incidental impact.”74 Kennedy’s explanation is silent
on the abuse alleged during confinement, a core issue in the complaint,
and instead held that one’s race cannot be used to state a legal claim, but
certain harms may fall upon a group or persons within a group, and the
disparate harm is a valid explanation that could defeat a claim.
Iqbal is filled with context. Shirin Sinnar of Stanford Law School,
challenged the Court’s “narrative that rendered Iqbal . . . nearly invisible,
[and] minimized the harm” he endured.75 Sinnar intended to “bring to life
the individual beyond the bare facts that the Justices found legally
relevant.” Parts III and IV of this paper accept that argument and add the
Court does more than merely reduce questions of race, it imposes it’s own
context.
Sinnar also identifies that the Iqbal Court conflated racial definitions
critical to their holding, specifically that “[m]ost Muslims are not Arab,
and most Arab-Americans are not Muslim” yet the terms were almost
70
71
72
73
74
75

556 U.S. 662, 669 (2009).
Id. at 680-681.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 Geo. L.J. 379, 384 (2017).
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interchangeable in the Iqbal opinion.76 This error undermines the Court’s
logic and questions whether the Court is able to make sound judgements
when race is involved, and the level of commitment the Justices have to
understanding the basics of race, generally.
Mueller himself represents this problem — Mueller was a beneficiary
in Iqbal, this landmark Supreme Court case which further neutralized race
as a legal matter. Was he then the best person to analyze the evidence
unveiled by the Senate on Russian Interference where racial matters were
at the forefront? Should there have been a special entity assigned to him
and his team to instill an appreciate the issues that race necessarily
involves? We may not know the answers, but given these facts, the inquiry
seems valid.

III: UNIQUELY AMERICAN. PROTECTION FOR ASSAULTIVE RACIAL
HATE SPEECH POST-CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT.
The fact that our Senate prioritized modern conceptions of First
Amendment rights over national security interests might have been
unthinkable to George Washington, considering his farewell address.77
Two early British doctrinaires who were influential in conceptions of free
speech were John Milton and Blackstone. Neither defended speech that
could undermine national unity. Quite the opposite.
Milton’s
Areopagitica, a speech addressed to the Parliament of England in 1644,
contains “several passages . . . ritualistically quoted to the exclusion of all
else [and] carry implications of majestic breadth” to support an absolutist
free speech sentiment.78 However, reading the document in full, his work
was narrow and advocated for severe punishment for damaging speech;
for example, he argued against the abuse of free speech and press in
shocking terms “if they be found mischievous and libellous, the fire and
the executioner will be the timeliest and the most effectuall remedy, that
mans prevention can use.”79 Hardly an absolutist approach to speech.
Blackstone, the influential British jurist was not an advocate for
modern, absolutist free speech either. Rather, Blackstone seems to invoke
a balancing test fit for American courts today:

76

Id. at 414.
See Washington, supra note 8.
78
Leonard W. Levy, Freedom of Speech in Seventeenth-Century Thought, 57 THE
ANTIOCH REVIEW 165, 171 (1999).
79
Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton For the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,
To the Parlament of England, THE JOHN MILTON READING ROOM, (noting the distinction
in Milton’s arguments between licensing and censorship, speech alone could be
punishable).
77
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“The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature
of a free state . . . Every freeman has an undoubted right
to lay what sentiments he pleases before the
public . . . .but if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of
his own temerity.”80
As George Washington promoted the “indissoluble community of
interest as one nation”81 encouraging the economic bond between North
and South under the aegis of silence on slavery, Blackstone explicitly
argued that societal cohesion was not to be attacked by speech or the press,
and indeed could be criminal:
[T]o punish as the law does at present any dangerous or
offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a fair
and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency,
is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order,
of government and religion, the only solid foundations of
civil liberty. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon
freedom of thought or inquiry; liberty of private sentiment
is still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad
sentiments, destructive to the ends of society, is the crime
which society corrects.82
Nor does our first iteration of the First Amendment, found in the
Articles of Confederation later transplanted into Article I, § 6 Cl. 1 of the
United States Constitution, provide for broad protections for speech to the
public. Before the Bill of Rights, protections for speech was very limited.
Our Constitution only provided that:
Senators and Representatives shall . . . .be privileged
from Arrest during their Attendance at the Sessions of
their respective Houses, and in going to and returning
from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either
House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.83
80

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, VOLUME 4: A
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769.
81
See infra p. 5.
82
BLACKSTONE, supra note 80.
83
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para.
5 (providing “Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or
questioned in any court or place out of Congress, and the members of Congress shall be
protected in their persons from arrests or imprisonments, during the time of their going to
and from, and attendance on Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace”).
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The Preservation of Peace and Good Order
This historical theme in free speech —governance, freedom of
thought, within bounds that preserve good order— was carried into 20th
Century American jurisprudence and provide a stark contrast to the
recommendations of the Senate advocating that free speech principles
must lead considerations even while combatting national security risks.
Indeed, in Schenck v. United States, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’
argued that the conspiracy charges for printing and distributing leaflets
against military participation in World War I were legitimate; the
defendants had no First Amendment protection that could overcome the
Espionage Act, nor the needs of the government and national security in
those circumstances.84 While the main legal test derived from Schenck is
“whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has the right to prevent” using the
short-hand “clear and present danger test” removes all context from the
analysis.85 Beyond prioritizing national security as a legal matter, Holmes
argued for a contextual review of speech as “the character of every act
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.”86 The intent of the
speaker was also simplified — the mere distribution of the leaflet in
Schenck was sufficient to find intent; the defendants offered no dispute in
the record.87 Engaging in the act was sufficient to prove intent.
Over time, the “clear and present danger” test lost ground, and the
Justices would vie for doctrinal dominance. Less powerful parties, i.e. the
political dissidents, would be exposed to asymmetrical harms.88 But the
role of context would end with Brandenburg’s acontextual, ahistorical
approach.

Race and the First Amendment Line of Cases
While most First Amendment cases argued the rights of political
speech and affiliation supportive of communism or socialism, one case
gives insight into the Court’s approach on race as a topic.
Terminiello v. City of Chicago was not a case adjudicating over a
group of political activists speaking against the United States
84

249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Id. at 52.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 51 (“Of course the document would not have been sent unless it had been
intended to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have
upon persons subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out.
The defendants do not deny that the jury might find against them on this point”).
88
See id. at 52.
85
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government.89 Rather, Terminiello was found guilty in lower courts of
disturbing the peace when he “vigorously, if not viciously, criticized
various political and racial groups whose activities he denounced as
inimical to the nation’s welfare.”90 The litigation leading to the Supreme
Court focused on the constitutionally protected status of his “derisive,
fighting words.”91 Yet the Court “[would] not reach that question” and
instead focused on a small procedural question — the manner in which a
charge was passed to the jury for review in the court below.92 Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, admitted that this was a question that
“the parties did not dispute . . . [but made its] adjudication no less ripe for
our review.”93
Douglas gently put distance between the power of Congress to protect
the nation and citizens, stating that “freedom of speech, though not
absolute . . . [is] protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown
likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”94
Douglas, writing that “the right to speak freely and promote diversity of
ideas . . . is [] one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from
totalitarian regimes”95 upheld the “clear and present danger” test, but
warned that “[t]here was no room under our Constitution for a more
restrictive view [f]or the alternate would lead to standardization of
ideas.”96
The majority avoided confronting assaultive racial and religious
speech, prompting vigorous dissents by fellow Justices Vinson,
Frankfurter, and Jackson. Jackson attacked Douglas by claiming the Court
now “fixe[d] its eyes on a conception of freedom of speech so rigid as to
tolerate no concession to society’s need for public order.”97 Jackson
argued that the contextual, fuller “clear and present” danger test was valid,
and that the impermissible nature of Terminiello’s hateful speech, laced
with racist invective proved “beyond dispute” that Chicago was “justified
in punishing Terminiello”98 — an argument aligned with both Milton and
Blackstone. Ending his dissent ominously, Jackson wrote “if the Court

89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3 (1949).
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 26.
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does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will
convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”99

The Silent Sea Change in Brandenburg
Brandenburg as our leading case on First Amendment rights today
should be reviewed using the facts of the case, including context of that
era. This section is critical of Brandenburg as the Senate’s determination
that we were subject to information warfare from an international
adversary through the weaponization our First Amendment rights reveals
a weakness: we are constrained by the same First Amendment rights that
we are being attacked through, yet the solutions that we may consider are
also constrained by those same First Amendment rights. This is a stunning
position to be in, warranting an analysis of the leading case law that binds
us in this paradox. This section begins with the facts of the Brandenburg,
which must be rebuilt as there was never a written opinion by one judge
— the state courts below offered no opinions, and the Supreme Court
decision was per curium. The section starts with a chronology of when
Clarence Brandenburg spoke, and the coordinating Klan violence that was
inescapable national news at the time — the summer of 1964 when the
Civil Rights Act was passed. Next is a look at the federal response the
Klan murders in Mississippi that Brandenburg referenced in his speech, as
well as the documented violence in St. Augustine, Florida at the same time.
Clarence Brandenburg was advocating for more Klan violence in these
two specific places that were national news at the time due to severe
violence and murders belies the notion that harm was not imminent. Next,
a look at the structure of the Brandenburg per curium opinion, the rushed
nature of the opinion, and an analysis of the dearth of appropriate case law
analogized to by the Court in reaching its conclusion (all case law used in
the analysis relates to Socialist or Communist party members speech and
associations against relevant statutes — not a sound comparison for
Klansmen advocating more violence at the peak of Klan violence). Finally,
a look at the reality of the politics and the players of the era. A
heavyweight on the Court, Justice Hugo Black, had a noted Klan past and
fiercely fought against anti-lynching bills as a United States Senator.
Considering the threats to our nation today, an honest analysis of
Brandenburg is warranted.

99
Id. at 37. The other dissenters on the Court were equally concerned and offended by
the majority’s undermining of the “clear and present danger” test by allowing this
otherwise impermissible hate speech to be granted constitutional cover when the majority
by focused on “one sentence . . . that was no part of the case until this Court’s independent
research ferreted it out [of the record].” Id. at 7.
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Facts of Brandenburg
Twenty years after Terminiello, Brandenburg was born out of
America’s head-on fight against racism and oppression during passing of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The speech in question was a particularized
and nationally broadcast threat by the Ku Klux Klan, during the height of
the violence during the Freedom Rides of June 1964. The violent Klan
speech was considered “mere advocacy” during a time of great violence.100
The opinion offered a sanitized version of the facts, and ignored the actual,
relentless violence this nation wrestled with during the Civil Rights
Movement. Without any context, the speech the Court narrowly focused
on is as follows:
We’re not a revengent organization, but if our President,
our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress
the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might
have to be some revengeance taken . . . .We are marching
on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred thousand
strong . . . From there . . . one group to march on St.
Augustine, Florida, the other group to march into
Mississippi. Thank you.101
Identifying Mississippi generally, and St. Augustine, Florida is
unusual. Why this one state, and why this one city, out of the thousands of
small cities in the United States?
While the opinion was released in 1969, Clarence’s Brandenburg’s
speech was given on June 28, 1964.102 June 1964 was a pivotal and volatile
month that gripped the nation: On June 19, 1964, the Senate passed H.R.
7152, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, after 60 straight days of debate in the
Senate, with Senate chambers “filled beyond capacity” and “hundreds
more gathered” “outside of the Capitol building along with news
cameras.103 By June 24, 1964, the F.B.I and the National Guard were
deployed to Mississippi to locate three murdered civil rights workers in a
case that gripped the nation, and remains notable for its violence a halfcentury later.104 On June 24, 1964, law enforcement in St. Augustine,
100

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Id. at 446.
102
Brief for Appellant at 4, Brandenburg v. Ohio, No. 492 (1964).
103
Civil Rights Act of 1964, UNITED STATES SENATE.
104
See infra pp. 23-26; see also Jason Daley, After 52 Years, the “Mississippi Burning”
Case Closes, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE, (noting that in 2016, Mississippi Attorney General
Jim Hood finally closed the case as officials concluded no new convictions were likely
despite the decades of work. At trial in 1967, the all-white jury and judge acquitted twelve
of the defendants, and the seven others received jail time ranging between tree and nine
years. Only 41 years later was “Edgar Ray Killen, the Klan leader who orchestrated the
101
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Florida advised that they no longer could control the violence there as
hundreds of segregationists were attacking non-violent protestors led by
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. who was based in St. Augustine for the month
of June.105 On July 2, 1964, President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 in a televised event.106 To distinguish Brandenburg’s speech as
not inciteful and not likely to create imminent lawless action is
questionable.

Mississippi Burning: Klan Violence in Mississippi & the Federal
Response in June 1964
June 1964 was the “Freedom Summer,” “a massive three-month
initiative to register southern Black people to vote in a direct response to
the Klan’scampaign of fear and terror.”107 This initiative enraged the local
Mississippi Klan who targeted one social worker, Michael Schwerner, in
particular for revenge — young, Jewish, and from New York, Schwerner
had been particularly active and successful in boycotts and voter
registration.108 On June 16, 1964 aiming to find Schwerner, the KKK —
according to the FBI— “descended on a local church meeting looking for
him” but not finding their target, the Klan simply “torched the church and
beat the churchgoers” instead.109 Returning on June 21st, the Klan
“firebombed the church, reducing it to charred rubble.”110
Later that evening, Schwerner, along with two other field workers
involved in helping register Black voters —James Chaney and Andrew
Goodman— were arrested for speeding, and for burning the church.111 It
was of course a rouse. That evening, the three voting registration workers
were released, but in a “preordained plan, KKK members followed” out
attack, found guilty of three counts of manslaughter. This national tragedy, represented the
violence at large on people of color and those who tried to aid them. President Barack
Obama in 2014 “posthumously awarded Chaney, Goodman and Schwerner the Medal of
Freedom, the highest civilian honor in the United States.”).
105
Equal Justice Initiative, White Community Members Protest Integration of St.
Augustine Beaches; Engage in Violence Over Several Days, https://calendar.eji.org/racialinjustice/jun/24.
106
Library of Congress, The Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Long Struggle for Freedom,
Television Coverage of President’s Johnson’s Remarks upon Signing the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
107
Mississippi Burning, FBI FAMOUS CASES & CRIMINALS.
108
Chaney, Goodman, & Schwerner, CORE CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY, Schwerner
was a CORE field worker and came to Mississippi with his wife. He organized boycotts of
stores who sold to Blacks but would not hire Blacks with success, received hate mail and
threats, including “police harassment.” Id.
109
See Mississippi Burning, supra note 107.
110
Ku Klux Klan, A History of Racism and Violence, Staff of the Klanwatch Project of
the Southern Poverty Law Center (6th Ed.), at 30.
111
Id. at 31.
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of the courthouse in “two carloads” — the Klansmen shot the three civil
rights workers point blank shortly thereafter, and buried the three young
men.112 On June 22, 1964, the Department of Justice was notified of their
“disappearance” and then-Attorney General Robert Kennedy got the FBI
involved; June 23rd the FBI found the charred car, and on June 24th, 1964,
the FBI and the National Guard “launched a massive search” for the Civil
Rights activists’ bodies.113 President Lyndon Johnson had the FBI open a
new office in Jackson, Mississippi to constrain the Klan.114 It is after all
of these events, that on June 28, 1964, Clarence Brandenburg threatened
to march the Klan to Mississippi before the victims’ bodies were even
found.
‘Mississippi Burning’ was major national and news. On June 27, 1964
alone, The New York Times devoted several articles to the mens’
disappearance, including the following lengthy front-page headline:
“DULLES REQUESTS MORE F.B.I. AGENTS FOR MISSISSIPPI; Urges
President to Expand Force in State to Control ‘Terroristic Activities’;
GRAVE DANGER IS CITED; U.S. Officials Arrest 3 White Men on
Charge of Threat to Civil Rights Workers.”115 Allen W. Dulles was the
former Director of Central Intelligence and served as President Johnson’s
special representative for this case; Dulles recommended that any
organization aiding voter registration and other Civil Rights projects in
Mississippi should alert their teams “that ‘very, very grave danger’
awaited them in that state.”116 Additionally, President Johnson sent 200
Naval officers to Mississippi to help find the bodies, along with Naval
helicopters.117 Many in Mississippi were upset. Mississippi House
Representative denounced federal involvement, claiming President
Johnson had “‘surrendered’ to the demands of ‘every left-wing agitator’
in the country.”118
KKK violence against the Freedom Riders was universally understood
as imminent and likely. The New York Times wrote that this “explosive
situation —[was] the first of what may be many in the summer ahead” and
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See Mississippi Burning, supra note 107.
Id.
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Id. (stating that the mens’ remains would not be found until August 4, 1964).
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Marjorie Hunter, DULLES REQUESTS MORE F.B.I. AGENTS FOR MISSISSIPPI;
Urges President to Expand Force in State to Control ‘Terroristic Activities’; ‘GRAVE
DANGER’ IS CITED; U.S. Officials Arrest 3 White Men on Charge of Threat to Civil
Rights Workers.” NY. TIMES, June 26, 1964.
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Id.
117
Tom Wicker, PRESIDENT SENDS 200 SAILORS TO AID IN MISSISSIPPI HUNT,
NY TIMES, June 25, 1964 (emphasis added).
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Id.
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understandably a high priority for the Justice Department, and the
President personally.119
J. Edgar Hoover gave the following instructions to the high-ranking
officers selected to work in the new Mississippi office “‘You will do
whatever it takes to defeat the Klan, and you will do whatever it takes to
bring law and order back to Mississippi.’”120 The violence was so severe
and so pervasive that F.B.I. agents themselves were recipients of threats,
being forced to “look underneath [our] cars to make sure we did not have
any dynamite strapped underneath.”121
Klan violence in Mississippi as a response to the federal push towards
Civil Rights was not new, again pointing to the predictability and
entrenchment of violence there. Medgar Evers, Mississippi’s first NAACP
field secretary, was shot in front of his home a few hours after President
Kennedy addressed the nation on television and radio about Civil
Rights.122 Evers died soon after.123 The assassin, Byron de la Beckwith was
tried twice in 1964 in Mississippi courts; both trials ending in jury
deadlock.124 The trails were a sham. Beckwith rose to the level of “folk
hero” in Mississippi and the sitting Mississippi Governor, Ross Barnett,
attended the trial as a “well-wisher” in support of the assassin.125
It is remarkable that the Supreme Court held language by a Klan
member who in a national broadcast promised that the Klan would seek
“revengeance” within days of Klan murders as “mere abstract teaching”,
protecting it via footnote as “peaceable assembly.”126 It simply defies
119

Id.
KKK Series, FBI FAMOUS CASES & CRIMINALS, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famouscases/kkk-series.
121
Id. Retired agents participated in an oral history of certain work of the F.B.I., here,
those agents assigned to infiltrate the Klan. It is unmistakable in the mandates of the Federal
government, accounts of the severity of their work, and the pride in feeling that their
sacrifices and dedication allowed the F.B.I. to “[break] the back of the Klan in Mississippi.”
This questions why the First Amendment was read by the Supreme Court to allow
continued advocacy of violence, in the height of a particularly violent moment in history.
Id.
122
John F. Kennedy, Report to the American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963)/
(advising the nation that the National Guard of Alabama was deployed to protect two Black
students, and to advance Kennedy’s and thus the Federal Government’s stance on the
urgent need for Civil Rights).
123
Medgar Evers, FBI CASES & CRIMINALS.
124
Ron Harrist, URGENT White Supremacist Byron De La Beckwith Convicted Of
Medgar Evers’ Murder, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 5, 1994). After the two failed and biased
trails in 1964, Evers’ widow attempted again to pursue the case. In 1991, on the third trial,
new witnesses and evidence of de la Beckwith’s guilt, finally receiving a life sentence for
the murder in 1994 — thirty years after Evers’ assassination. Id.
125
Id.
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Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449, n. 4 (1969) (citing to De Jonge v. Oregon,
229 U.S. 353, 364 (1937)) (“Statutes affecting the right of assembly . . . must observe the
120
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reason to refer to these several weeks in American history, in these
particularized locations, while our federal government was actively
engaged in tampering extreme violence as “times of peace” and questions
the decision-making process in Brandenburg.

Klan Violence in St. Augustine, Florida: the “worst in years” in
June 1964 as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Visited to Desegregate
the City
On the same frontpage cover of the N.Y. Times on June 26, 1964
addressing violence in Mississippi, was another article directly relevant to
Brandenburg: “St. Augustine Aides Say They Cannot Keep Peace” with an
image of the Florida Governor, Farris Bryant, touring the Old Slave
Market in St. Augustine “where racial disturbances occurred.”127 St.
Augustine law enforcement advised a Federal judge in Jacksonville,
Florida “that they were unable to stop white mobs from assaulting civil
rights demonstrators.”128 This admission in court followed “a night of
terror in which white mobs routed the police [and assaults] including
women and children.”129 More victims received emergency hospital care
in the “worst outbreak of racial violence since [civil rights demonstrations
had begun]” a year prior.130 The Times implicating the local Sheriff as
having close affiliations with Klan leaders in St. Augustine, through
“social organization[s] . . . regarded here as nearly synonymous with the
Klan.”131 The “racial situation in St. Augustine was “‘very dangerous and
explosive’” leading the Florida Governor to send in 80 additional State
Troops.132
The N.Y. Times frontpage article focused on the 200 or so people who
attacked the civil rights marchers. Also on June 25, 1964, about 100 Black
people were attacked for attempting to enter the waters of a beach.133 The
violence on St. Augustine was relentless. In another N.Y. Times headline,
“Dr. King Describes St. Augustine As Most Lawless City He’s Seen”
reporting on multiple death threats against Dr. King’s life and gunshots
into the car of a man driving home with his young son from a meeting
established distinctions between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless
action, . . . ‘The right of peaceable assembly [like free speech] . . . is equally
fundamental”).
127
Homer Bigart, St. Augustine Aides Say They Cannot Keep Peace, N.Y. TIMES, June
26,1964.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
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where Dr. King addressed a crowd of Black people on civil rights
activities.134 Dr. King held news conferences and advised that the White
House gave him assurances that Federal and state authorities would
[protect] his demonstrators.135 Federal protection was needed as the
“County Sheriff . . . had recruited special deputies to handle racial trouble
from the ranks of the Ku Klux Klan.”136 Indeed, six days later, the Times
continued their reporting on Klan violence in St. Augustine claiming that
by night, St. Augustine “is the scene of an outpouring of racial hatred and
violence.”137 With weapons found along the path of demonstrators
including “sulfuric [sic] acid, chains, and clubs.”138
These known events in Mississippi and St. Augustine call into
question the formation of the Brandenburg test, that a State is not allowed
to limit or punish “advocacy of the use of force or of law except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.”139 Certainly, the specificity
of calling the Klan to these two focal points of ongoing Klan violence
qualifies as incitement and the intent to produce “imminent lawless
action.”140 Further, the Brandenburg test does not require success or
completion of an act. Imminent means “impending” “hanging over one’s
head” and “close at hand.”141 The test is therefore a bit odd temporally to
Mississippi and St. Augustine — violence was perpetual, it had occurred,
was occurring, and certainly threatened to continue to occur. As troops
were sent to both locations, encouraging more Klansmen to march in
defiance absolutely threatens more violence. If the test fails because one
does not believe in the imminence of the violence or the likeliness of
violence at that time, that lack of belief is not credible.
Mississippi and St. Augustine were the frontlines for entrenched Klan
violence. Further, in both locations, the Klan was entrenched in law
enforcement, making the “revengeance” that Brandenburg advocated
more likely: violence in those locations was sanctioned and given cover.142
The erasure of the violence of the summer of 1964 also questions the
validity of the concurrences in Brandenburg Court. Justice Douglas,
134

Homer Bigart, supra note 127.
Id.
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Id.
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John Herbers, Martin Luther King and 17 Others Jailed Trying to Integrate St.
Augustine Restaurant, N.Y. TIMES,
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Id.
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Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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See id.
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Imminent, Oxford English Dictionary.
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See Mississippi Burning, supra note 107 (noting that both the Deputy and Sheriff were
indicted and arrested in the murders); see also Homer Bigart, supra note 127 (noting that
the sheriff was involved with an organization synonymous with the Klan).
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concurring, argued that “the ‘clear and present’ danger test [might be]
congenial to the First amendment in time of a declared war . . . [but] not
reconcilable with the First Amendment in days of peace.”143 Claiming that
this moment in American history —abductions, murder, bombings, arson,
beatings, etc.— were “days of peace” casts doubt on the logic of that
concurrence. Further, the rest of the nation knew of the violence, and was
getting play-by-play news on the violence. That Douglas made such a
claim casts a shadow on his words.
On June 25, 1964, Walter Cronkite dedicated one full hour of national
news coverage to the Mississippi Burning case.144 For comparison,
Cronkite only dedicated fourteen minutes to the Watergate scandal in
1972.145 Cronkite opened his one-hour special to the nation, “The Search
in Mississippi” stating that the three men were “the focus of a whole
country’s concern” with footage of a Black civil rights leader warning the
civil rights workers from the North that “people should expect to get
beaten . . . you might even get killed” when trying to warn them of the
dangers of this work.146 These statements were within the first minute of
the broadcast.
The white Mississippians interviewed commented that that “the real
crux of our problem . . . under the Civil Rights Bill is an attempt to
revolutionize society by force.”147 This fear was expressed by Clarence
Brandenburg in his speech “Give us our state rights.”148 The fact that the
Civil Rights Bill was brought to the Senate Floor by subverting the normal
procedure that would have required Mississippi Senator’s involvement,149
may have added to the local conception that Congress’ authority was not
valid. Further, while many Americans of all backgrounds were moved by
the “substantive evils” prevalent in the violence and oppression of Black
people, the intense maneuvering to get the Bill passed and the lack of
support by almost one-third of the Senate may have sustained a narrative
that there were no “substantive evils,” and that Congress did not have the
proper authority to pass the Civil Rights bill.
143

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 452 (Douglas, J., concurring).
From the Archives: “The Search in Mississippi” featuring Walter Cronkite, CBS
NEWSHOUR (July 17, 2014), (broadcasting originally on June 25, 1964).
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Douglas Martin, Waler Cronkite, 92, Dies; Trusted Voice of TV News, N.Y.TIMES
(July 17, 2009), .
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CBS NEWSHOUR, supra note 144, at :10 and 14:06.
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Id. at 47:46.
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Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 457, n. 1.
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See id, see also Landmark Legislation: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 Senate Chamber
Desk, United States Senate. (stating that Senator Mansfield placed the Civil Right Bill on
the Senate calendar directly, rather than “refer it to the Judiciary Committee, chaired by
civil rights opponent James Eastland of Mississippi” as Eastland would subvert civil rights
legislation.)
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Improper Analogies in Brandenburg: Socialism and Racial
Violence as Incoherent Analogies
Brandenburg is unique as much of the prior twentieth-century First
Amendment case law used for analogies involved bias against socialists
and fear of overthrow of the United States government, espionage, and
involvement with various Communist Parties. While Terminiello included
racially motivated hate speech, that opinion never addressed the content
of the speech, rather focused upon one hidden procedural issue below.150
Brandenburg citied to no case that addressed hate speech or racial
violence.151 Instead, the thrust of Brandenburg’s legal reasoning was
based on eight cases, generally dealing with socialist groups and speech,
striking down statutes on overbreadth and vagueness, that “failed to draw
distinctions” between the “mere abstract teaching and moral necessity
[for] force and violence” in speech versus “actually preparing a group for
violent action and steeling it to such action.”152 The Court was seeking to
demark the kind of speech that “the Constitution has immunized from
governmental control.”153
Of those eight cases, three highlight the general lack of applicability
of the group. In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, the Court in 1964 found
that legislation under the Subversive Activities Control Act was
150

See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S.
152
Id. (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (on advocacy of governmental
overthrow by members of the Communist party in California by joining the party,
recruiting, and writing and publishing “The Daily Worker”; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937) (defendants arrested during a speech on July 24, 1934, open to the public, given
by the Communist Party, protesting conditions of the country jail, and actions of the police
as to a workers’ strike); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (overturning a CA
statute that made any display of a red flag (banner, badge, or device) an “invitation or
stimulus to anarchistic action . . . of a seditious character guilty of a felony.”); United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (when Congress’ exercise of one of its enumerated powers
clashes with those individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, it is our ‘delicate and
difficult task’ to determine whether the resulting restriction on freedom can be tolerated;
holding unconstitutional § 5(a)(1)(D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64
Stat. holding that “it shall be unlawful for any member of the [Communist] organization
‘to engage in any employment in any defense facility.’; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967) (finding state plans to terminate or prevent appointment of “subversive”
employees unconstitutional by members of faculty for a university); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966) (finding it a violation of the First Amendment to force a loyalty oath
on an Arizona school teacher); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (finding
the clause of the Subversive Activities Control Act making it a felony for a member of a
Communist organization “to apply for, use or attempt to use a passport” as
“unconstitutional on its face”); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (holding that the
Washington statutes requiring teachers and state employees, as condition of employment,
to take loyalty oaths are unconstitutionally vague)).
153
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“unconstitutional on its face” and could not impose a felony charge for
members of the Communist party who “apply for, use or attempt to use a
passport.”154 The Aptheker Court held that this statute “too broadly and
indiscriminately restricts the right to travel and thereby abridges the liberty
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.”155 The Court chose to extend the
argument to the First amendment guarantee of freedom of association as
“the right to travel cannot be dismissed by asserting that the right to travel
could be fully exercised if the individual would first yield up his
membership in a given association.”156 Brandenburg contained no Fifth
Amendment legal claim. Further, arguing that a state cannot punish
Brandenburg’s violent speech to “bury” a victimized racial minority group
while filming themselves for broadcast, bearing arms, burning a cross, and
promising that “we intend to do our part” after national outrage of that
exact violence is not properly analogized against a question of whether a
state can prevent members of a Communist group from obtaining and
using passports.
In Baggett v. Bullitt, the Court held that state statutes requiring
“loyalty oaths” as a condition of employment for teachers and state
employees were unconstitutional.157 Concerns on the “vagueness” the
teachers could suffer included hypotheticals that criticism of “the design
or color scheme of the state flag or unfavorable comparison [] with that of
a sister State or foreign country could be deemed disrespectful and
therefore violative of the oath.”158 The vagueness and overbreadth in
Baggett would force the oath-taker to “‘steer far wider of the unlawful
zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked.’”159 The appellants concern was that they could not understand at
what point speech would be proscribed by the oath, nor “define the range
of activities” that would convert a permissible act into an impermissible
act.160 Here also, there is vast legal space between the concerns in
Brandenburg and Baggett. The Court in Baggett analyzed hypotheticals
on what meaning could be proscribed to preferences on the color scheme
of flags to demonstrate overbreadth; the statute in question in
Brandenburg punished speech that advocated “crime, violence, or
154

Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 500.
Id. at 504.
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Id. at 507.
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377 U.S. 360 (1964).
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Id. at 371.
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Id. at 372.
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Id. at 378 (noting also that the state of Washington statute in question had never been
interpreted by the state courts. The Supreme Court argued that abstention, returning this
case to Washington to decide, would only give rise to “extensive adjudications, under the
impact of a variety of factual situations, would bring the oath within the bounds of
permissible constitutional certainty”).
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unlawful methods of terrorism.”161 Those dangers had and were continuing
to occur in the specific places referenced by the speaker, such that it
became the personal focus of the President of the United States to reign in
that violence. Brandenburg could not rely on claims of vagueness or
uncertainty as to what type of speech was permissible as the Court did in
Baggett —cross burning and naming groups to assault as they were being
assaulted are specific and obvious. The Court went beyond the required
inciting or producing imminent lawless action that is likely to incite or
produce such action, to also require “preparing a group for violent action
and steeling it to such action.”162
Here, the Court anchored the Brandenburg reasoning to Noto v. United
States.163 Noto is yet another case dealing with restraints on Communist
Party affiliations via statutory restrictions, and again, with no discernible
connection to the risks of racially assaultive speech.164 Noto was an
inappropriate analogy and was overgeneralized and misapplied in
Brandenburg. In Noto, the Court constrained their holding to Communist
party activity, as “the mere abstract teaching of Communist theory,
including the teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for
a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for
violent action and steeling it to such action.”165 Brandenburg altered the
Noto holding by simple ellipses without any explanation or substance,
holding that “‘the mere abstract teaching * * * * of the moral propriety . . .
‘” collapsing the teaching of Communist theory with advocating and
encouraging Klan violence, creating a generality not logically related to
Noto.166
Further, even if Noto was apposite, the Brandenburg Court then
should have employed the use of context and reasonable levels of evidence
as offered in the Noto holding — Noto was rich in substantive analysis that
Brandenburg refused to engage in:
There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a
call to violence now or in the future which is both sufficiently strong and
161

See id., see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969) (the full citing in the
case to the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute was “for advocat(ing) . . . the duty,
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform’ and for ‘voluntarily assembl(ing)
with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines
of criminal syndicalism.”).
162
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
163
Noto v. U.S. 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
164
Id.
165
Id. at 297-298. Additionally, Noto references this not as a new holding, but as a rule
through stare decisis “‘We held in Yates, and we reiterate now . . . ,” a stark difference to
the bold altering of prior caselaw in Brandenburg.
166
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
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sufficiently pervasive to lend color to the otherwise ambiguous theoretical
material regarding Communist Party teaching, and to justify the inference
that such a call to violence may fairly be imputed to the Party as a whole167
Brandenburg refused to properly acknowledge the real violence that
gripped the nation in June 1964 in Mississippi and St. Augustine, Florida
in contravention to Noto. Instead, the Court surgically pulled from recent
doctrinal evolutions on the First Amendment that had never been used for
the specific power paradigm at issue — the stronger group advocating for
additional racial violence against a weaker group. The power paradigm in
Brandenburg conflicted with the prior case law it cited, In Noto, Baggett,
and Aptheker, the Court protected the weaker party (socialist and
communist party affiliates, and teachers and state employees wishing to
avoid a loyalty oath) against the more powerful party, the government.
Noto, Baggett, and Aptheker do not relate to the underlying facts in
Brandenburg with well known, well documented violence that left many
terrorized, injured, or dead.

Brandenburg’s Per Curium Status, Justice Abe Fortas’ Forced
Resignation, and a Bare-Bones, Rushed, and Edited Opinion
Brandenburg is not only questionable in its logic that “days of peace”
can include the Klan murders of Mississippi Burning, or President
Johnson’s personal oversight of the FBI and Armed Forces involvement
to quell violence. Brandenburg is a per curium opinion, sterilely written,
which is in sharp contrast to lengthy, impassioned, and intellectual
arguments in both prior First Amendment opinions and dissents. Since
Schenck in 1918, Justices had vied for doctrinal supremacy in this space.168
The silence in Brandenburg cannot be missed.
The early procedural path of Brandenburg is unique in that no written
opinion accompanied the case to the Supreme Court.169 The lack of
statements, testimony, and analysis of fact are unusual, and would
logically lead to the desire for a “robust and open” analysis in the opinion,
particularly given the path of First Amendment cases in the Court during
the prior fifty years. The Supreme Court did not fill that void.
167

Noto, 367 U.S. at 298.
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The opinions and dissents in First
Amendment cases are notable in part for the intellectual arguments advanced, and the
ability to see the judges align doctrinally and attempt to advance their conception of the
First Amendment protections is beyond the scope of this paper, but a few of the cases on
the path to Brandenburg discussed demonstrate this point.
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Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445; see also Brief for Appellant at 1, Brandenburg v. Ohio,
No. 492 (1964) (“There are no written opinions, either reported or unreported, in this case.
The Judge assigned to write the opinion for the Ohio Court of Appeals died before
completing it, and the Ohio Supreme Court issued no opinion.”).
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Martha A. Field, currently a Langdell Professor of Law at Harvard
Law School, clerked for Justice Abe Fortas in the 1968-69 Supreme Court
term and worked directly with him on writing the Brandenburg opinion.170
Her account is pivotal to understanding the abnormal and harried gestation
of this landmark case despite the tectonic shift into the expansive First
Amendment protections Brandenburg gave rise to. Field’s account is that
Justice Fortas knew while writing Brandenburg that the opinion would be
released as a per curium decision as he expected to submit his resignation
before release.171 Brandenburg was written “on a rushed schedule.”172 The
“opinion went to the conference on a Friday, [then was quickly] assigned
to Justice Fortas.173 Brandenburg was written just in time for submission
— Fortas resigned the day after the Court voted to adopt his opinion.174
All Field knew was “that Justice Fortas needed to have the opinion right
away.”175
We may never know what damage the adverse conditions
Brandenburg was written in caused. But a germ of doubt appears in
Field’s writing about the end result:
I’ve often thought since Brandenburg that we should have focused
more . . . on both the type and the gravity of the danger. The danger, if
there was any in Brandenburg, was grave: an assault on American values,
an appeal to white supremacy and anti-Semitism.”176
While Field sees the “grave danger” in Brandenburg, she does not go
as far as offering Brandenburg’s speech was connected to violence; she
does acknowledge that Brandenburg is “wholly unlike” prior landmark
First Amendment cases given the unique dangers presented.177 Field notes
that “[u]ntil Brandenburg, “the clear and present cases focused on either
overthrow of the government or interference with a U.S. war” situations
not equal to documented Klan violence against a discrete minority
group.178 Nor does it address the immediate shift in the power-paradigm
170

Martha A. Field, Brandenburg v. Ohio Its Relationship to Masses Publishing Co. v.
Patten, 50 Ariz. St. L.J. 791 (2018). Field wrote that she had declined speaking about this
topic for fifty years out of deference to Court etiquette imposed by then Chief Justice Earl
Warren. Her decision to speak in 2018 was aided by the change in direction on speaking
about Court decisions.
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Id. at 800.
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Id. at 791.
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Id.
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Id. at 801. Further accounts claim that Fortas missed the editing process altogether
given this unfortunate, rushed pace.
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Id.
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Id. at 798.
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Id.
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Id. (citing to Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450–53 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (summarizing the prominent cases involving the clear and present danger
test)).
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between parties in First Amendment cases. In the Espionage-Communist
line of First Amendment cases, it was the powerful government who
sought protection against defendants often seen as weak.179 Justice
Douglas dissenting in Dennis hinted at the value he placed on the powerparadigm by arguing that a parties’ “abhorrent” speech was not enough to
nudge that speech into constitutionally unprotected territory, rather it was
an analysis of the power of the persons, and the extent of their reach into
societal power dynamics that did.180
Field also casts doubt on the legal result in Brandenburg. According
to Field, “Fortas viewed Brandenburg as a resuscitation and clarification
of the clear and present danger test.”181 In the opinion, “Fortas wanted to
say that a clear substantial imminent danger is what is required” to lose
First Amendment protections.182 Further support exists that Fortas merely
intended to place Brandenburg as “just one in a long line of cases seeking
to apply the clear and present danger test”, and in no way intended
Brandenburg to be a landmark decision that broke with precedent.183
Changes were made to the opinion upon Fortas’ departure, before
release to the public; Justice Brennan’s edits removed positive reference
to the clear and present danger test, and inserted language constraining the
Government from allowing substantive review of speech.184 It was
Brennan who added that the advocacy in question must be “‘likely to
incite’ imminent lawless action.”185 This seemingly small change altered
the course of our laws. Fortas’ version of the clear and present danger test
required an inquiry into whether “the social conditions existed for lawless
action, while Brennan’s formulation asked if the advocacy itself would
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See Abrams et al. v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (advocating that the party
with less power should not be punished, commenting that the defendants were “poor and
puny anonymities” from whom not enough could be “squeezed from” to make a material
difference”); see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, (1951) (J. Douglas,
dissenting) (claiming that defendants in the Communist party were “miserable merchants
of unwanted ideas; their wares remain unsold. The fact that their ideas are abhorrent does
not make them powerful . . . political impotence . . . does not . . . dispose of the problem.
Their numbers; their position in industry and government; the extent to which they have
infiltrated the police . . . and other critical places all bear on the likelihood that their
advocacy will endanger the Republic”).
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Dennis, 341 U.S. at 589 (“[t]heir numbers; their positions in industry and government;
the extent to which they have infiltrated the police, the armed forces . . . all bear on the
likelihood that their advocacy . . . will endanger the Republic”).
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produce” the lawless action regardless of the social conditions.186 Wholly
different tests. Under Fortas’ clear and present danger test, context and a
substantive review were part of the submitted Brandenburg test. Under
the edited per curium opinion, the test became narrow, stripped the role of
context, and forced a review of utterances divorced from context.
Martha Field studied and confirmed the difference in the two opinions,
and supports the argument that Fortas submitted his opinion with the “clear
and present danger” test, but that language was edited out by Brennan.187
Further, Field reminds us that Justice Black’s concurrence spoke out
strongly against the clear and present danger test, that it “should have no
place in the interpretation of the First Amendment.”188 Justice Douglas
claimed that the clear and present danger test was “not reconcilable with
the First Amendment in days of peace.”189 In light of the power
Brandenburg has today, and the effect seen in the Senate Intelligence
Report on Russian Active Measures, the harried, per curium backdrop, and
the either perversion or erasure of context certainly questions the roots of
that decision. Moreover, the actual context in Brandenburg is simple and
does not require deep reflection. Days of peace are not days the President
sends in troops and dispatches the F.B.I. to quell violence and murder, nor
when law enforcement in St. Augustine advised their federal courts and
state Governor that they could not control the outsized violence in their
state fomented by the Klan. Brandenburg is problematic for these many
substantial reasons.
Lastly, the sea change Brandenburg brought to free speech is worthy
of review for no other reason than the sharp change in law. Brandenburg
pointedly “undermined the logic of several other early cases.”190 Leading
legal scholars today posit that “[w]e might even wonder about the
correctness of . . . Brandenburg to the extent that th[is] landmark cases
broke with prior case law.”191 This stark change in First Amendment
186

Id. at 527. This explains also the awkward and redundant language in the holding
“advocacy directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action.”
187
Field, supra note 171, at 801.
188
Id. (commenting that as the late edits to Brandenburg are silent on the clear and
present test, the insistence that Justice Black put on negating it’s importance points to the
fact that the original opinion was indeed base on the clear and present danger test) ; see
also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969).
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Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449-50.
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Id. at 505. Akhil Reed Amar found the renegade nature of Brandenburg, and “other
constitutional modalities” outside of case law and doctrine are “strong additional support
for a robust constitutional right of political expression.” This then requires the reader to
accept Brandenburg’s threats as political expression, and a manner of self-governance.
Amar used Brandenburg while showing the path to today’s “rock-solid” “free expression
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jurisprudence on its own suggest that Brandenburg is ripe for
reexamination. That the extensive findings of the Senate’s Select
Committee on Intelligence confirm race is a unique topic within speech, is
a tool to efficiently and effectively divide our nation and interfere with
American “citizens and democratic institutions” through our “existing
weaknesses” provides just the opportunity for urgent review now.192
However, it is the “existing weaknesses” that require a legal analysis that
appreciates racially charged threats, and does not treat these threats as a
mere intellectual exercise.193 Much analysis of Brandenburg includes
scholars dismissing the legitimate fear and harm of Klan threats, looking
only to “the record [which] revealed almost no evidence of likely
effect.”194 Further, that the Klan threat was “silly” . . . “[a]lthough some of
the group had guns . . . nobody can suppose that a silly, hateful speech by
an unknown man would present any immediate danger to the President,
Congress, or the Supreme Court.”195
As reviewed earlier, this paper identifies the exact Klan violence and
threats. Moreover, the threat was not just to Congress, it was to the
innocent people of Mississippi and St. Augustine, Florida who were
victims — they deserved consideration. Today, we have entered an era
where violent speech has materialized into real violence and threats to
members of Congress and the Vice President. Dismissing the harms in
Brandenburg was unwarranted and has not served us well.

Klan Terror & The Law. Justice Black’s Klan Past & His Senate
Anti-Lynching Filibuster
Justice Black was a prominent advocate of absolutist First
Amendment protections. In his famous speech at NYU in 1960, Black
discussed the historical demands for the Bill of Rights but focused on
“[t]he First Amendment [as] truly the heart of the Bill of Rights.”196 Black
recounted draconian punishments in England, citing to examples of
William Prynne a lawyer who was mutilated for nothing more than
“writing books and pamphlets.”197 However this concern for corporal
of political opinions.” However if one does not agree that the klan threats were political
expression, we can note that to some extent, Brandenburg is an outlier, supporting its reexamination.
192
Sen. Intel. Rep., supra note 2, at 5, 21.
193
See id. at 21.
194
Gilles, supra note 184, at 519.
195
Id. (paraphrasing Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, which is an example of treating
such a threat as an intellectual exercise).
196
Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 881 (1960).
197
Id. at 870. The account is quite gruesome: Black told the students that Pyrnne’s ears
were cut off by court order, then then “subsequently, by another court order, had his
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safety was absent in his Brandenburg concurrence. Black insisted that the
“‘clear and present danger’ doctrine should have no place in the
interpretation of the First Amendment.”198 Black did not explain why
threats of bodily harm are acceptable, while sustaining that the harm, once
committed, is an evil. Nor would Black question Douglas’ claims that
these were times of peace, nor question the depositions in the Brief for
Appellant from Klan officials on the “fraternal nature of the Klan and its
organizational prohibition against violence.”199
The Appellant’s Brief to the Court included supporting statements via
deposition from the President (Imperial Wizard) of the Klan, James K.
Venable, who professed to a zero-tolerance rule within the Klan against
violence, and that Venable continually advised all national Klan branches
to refrain from violence in their effort to “accomplish this race war as you
might call it.”200 This statement fails for many reasons — first the notion
of a peaceful “race war” is either a stunning euphemism or admission of a
violent goal, and further, why would the leader of a peaceful organization
need to continually remind the Klan at large to refrain from violence unless
violence was a recurring issue? Further, this professed Klan advocate of
peace did not seek the humanity in non-violent, peaceful assembly for any
reason other than reluctantly as a means and an end, not because violence
is bad, it just “gets us all in trouble.”201 Finally, as Brandenburg’s speech
was made during the height of Klan violence, the Wizard was notably
silent on any commentary about the violence from his organization. These
questions are absent in the opinion.
A second key Klan deposition was that of William Morris, noted as “a
long time Klansman” who simply wrote about the Klan.202 Morris’
deposition attempted to position the act of burning crosses as elevated,
spiritual conduct, commenting that burning crosses is pure, and merely has
a spiritual meaning to all Klan members, in the language of the
ritualism, symbolism . . . remindin[ing] that the cross upon which our
Savior died, [] is the criterion of character of every Klansman . . . .Now,
the fiery cross has a tremendous spiritual significance to us, also, because
we are reminded that Jesus Christ said, ‘I am the light of the World’ . . .
that God guarded the entrance to the Garden of Eden with a flaming
remaining ear stumps gouged out while he was on a pillory.” Surely accounts like that are
intended to gain support for broad protections of speech. However, Black should be equally
concerned then about violence against the recipient of that speech. It is an odd bargain that
an innocent person should be forced to suffer violence so that the speaker is absolved from
violence.
198
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1969).
199
Brief for Appellant at 4, Brandenburg v. Ohio, No. 492 (1964).
200
Id.
201
Id. at 7.
202
Id. at 5, n. 1.

2021]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

101

sword . . . and guided the Children of Israel on their journey to the
Promised Land by pillar of fiery night . . . .So, when we add fire to the
cross, we simply are proclaiming to the world our fiery zeal. Fire is the
greatest purifier yet known to man. So we symbolically stand before the
world in that manner.203
Morris was of course much more than a member who only wrote about
the Klan — he was the Wizard in Alabama.204 In fact, Morris was one of
two men responsible for the resurgence of the Klan in Alabama, filing the
incorporation papers for the Klan with the State of Alabama in 1946,
stating, “‘[a]ll we want to do is keep the colored man in his place.’”205 And
so the terror began. By 1949, Morris’ Alabama chapter of the Klan swelled
in numbers and violence. At a Klan Rally outside of the city courthouse,
Morris advised listeners that the Klan was “ready to ‘ride’” leading to the
burning of eighty-nine crosses and violence against twenty people within
two weeks.206 This violence led Morris to jail when he refused to cooperate
with Alabama courts and deliver information the courts required to
prosecute local “hooded violence” several years before this Brief was
submitted.207 If the National Wizard made it a point to preach peace to the
local chapters, that seems to have been lost in the face of actual violence.
Further, the violence in Alabama was so widespread and severe under
Morris’ Klan that it was national news — it would have been hard for the
Justices or their clerks to not have known.208
One would hope that today, such depositions would not be left
unchallenged. But the times in 1969 were different. Justice Black himself
had been a member of the Alabama Klan as a young lawyer, leading to his
election to the U.S. Senate.209 Like the sanitization of Klan violence in
Brandenburg, Black’s membership in the Klan is generally excused even
today. The United States Senate website comments that Black had no
choice but to join the Klan, as he equated “membership with courtroom
success” given the breadth of Alabama lawyers and jurors who were part
of the Klan.210 Our Senate today still maintains the incompatible realities
on this matter, that Black soon resigned from the Alabama Klan and “spent
the rest of his life regretting” having joined the Klan, yet somehow
balanced regret with personal gain as Black “enlisted help from Klan
203
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leaders in his successful race for the U.S. Senate” after his resignation
form the Klan.211
But what did Hugo Black reject by leaving the Klan? In 1935, the
Costigan-Warner anti-lynching bill was up for vote in the Senate.
Southern Senators crafted a filibuster that blocked all other Senate
business, including debate on passage of the new Social Security Bill.212
The Wagner-Costigan bill died in 1935 due to the Southern Senators
filibuster, in large part, due to Hugo Black as one of two Southern Senators
who led the filibuster.213 When the filibuster was finally successful, thus
killing the bill to curb lynching, the architects of the filibuster, “Tom
Connally of Texas and Hugo Black of Alabama — grinned at each other
and shook hands.”214 Two years later, when Black had already ascended
to the Supreme Court unburdened by his role in these dark alliances, the
new 1937 anti-lynching bill was under filibuster attack in the Senate. His
former partner, Tom Connally used Black’s prior 1935 filibuster speech in
absentia, proudly boasting “I know at least one justice who will never vote
to sustain this anti-lynching law when it comes before the Supreme Court.
That Justice is Mr. Justice Black.”215
Claims that Hugo Black was a First Amendment absolutist are
assailable. The same term as Brandenburg, Justice Black wrote a
vehement dissent in Tinker v. Des Moines, another landmark case
protecting the First Amendment rights, this time of school children silently
wearing two-inch black armbands to express disapproval of the Vietnam
war.216 Tinker, also authored by Abe Fortas, was argued and decided three
months before Brandenburg. In Tinker, Black argued that “[i]t is a
myth . . . that any person has a constitutional right to say what he pleases,
where he pleases, and when he pleases.”217 Black noting that “one defying
pupil was [] 8 years old” still related this second-grade student wearing a
pro-peace armband to is concern that “some of the country’s greatest
problems are crimes committed by the youth” and relating the Tinker
children to “the loudest-mouthed, but maybe no the brightest, students”
who forced their “whims and caprices” on others.218 Whether Black was
subtly digging at both the anti-war protests on campus, or perhaps the
211
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students who were in the 1960’s protesting for racial equality is not clear.
But what is clear in Black’s writings is his disdain and refusal to allow for
First Amendment protections for the Tinker children, while wholly
advocating for First Amendment protections for Klan members,
brandishing guns, stating their intent to march on Congress, and “bury”
meaning kill Black and Jewish people at the exact moment that Black
people and Jewish people were being killed by the Klan.219
Given the incredible silence of Brandenburg on the Klan and Justice
Black’s well-known Klan membership, Black’s role defeating antilynching legislation, and the vacillation he showed in First Amendment
jurisprudence at the time of Brandenburg, can we really rely on this
interpretation of fact on racial violence and the Klan, this opinion, or his
general advocacy away from balancing tests? Today, the expansive
freedom in Brandenburg binds us. The United States Senate’s conclusions
that we are under attack by an adversary exploiting our societal divisions
through broad protections of first amendment privileges, while those
same, expansive privileges also prevent us from protecting ourselves
seems an incalculable error. Brandenburg is at the center of those modern
privileges, warranting a critical look at the painful facts of the case, at the
errant procedure, and the incredible indifference to race and the law we
have struggled with throughout the history of this country.
There is an alternative First Amendment doctrine that can be applied
allowing both flexibility but protective. Revisiting the Dennis v. United
States framework allows action on issues of national security as they
develop and does not require the courts to “wait until the putsch is about
to be executed” and maintain First Amendment protections along
dangerous paths.220 Brandenburg’s “imminent and likely” standard means
the exact act must in fact be in the process of occurring, exactly what
Dennis intended to prevent. The danger in affording speech protection
through the point that illegal and harmful actions are already emergent
means that victims will always face danger under Brandenburg, In
Dennis, Chief Justice Vinson adopted the Learned Hand test which held
that “[i]n each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
219

In Tinker is helpful to note that Fortas’ majority opinion did weigh the importance
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necessary to avoid the danger.”221 Vinson and that majority welcomed the
efficiency of the test, “it is as succinct and inclusive as any other [test] we
might devise” and appreciated the contextual space allotted “[i]t takes into
consideration those factors which we deem relevant, and relates their
significances.”222 Today as we face the reality that racial divisions are a
national security threat, from the Senate Intelligence Report, and now
reckoning with the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol, applying the
Dennis test and abandoning Brandenburg could be necessary to protect
our national interests.223

IV: RACIAL BLINDSPOTS FORGED DEEP INTO OUR LAWS
Brandenburg is unfortunately not an island of miscalculations by the
Court on race. Other landmark Supreme Court cases add to the disabilities
in properly addressing any analysis concerning race legally. The legacy of
these additional cases likely constrained how the Senate reacted to the
findings on racial divisions and the Russian Active Measures campaign.
First, this section reveals the use of the burgeoning Law and
Economics theories in the 1970s case Washington v. Davis, which asserted
through fuzzy opinions that discrimination was a good. Here, empirical
data was not the foundation, rather observations by those the Court felt
comfortable relying upon as authorities. Next, this section identifies the
rejection of empirical data in McCleskey v. Kemp, and the Court’s blunt
statement that race is an “irrelevant” legal factor even when confronted
with sophisticated studies that the Court accepted as factually accurate.224
Washington v. Davis & the “Irrelevance” of Race in Law
In Washington v. Davis, Black applicants for the Washington D.C.
Police Force brought suit against the Police Chief in Washington D.C. and
Commissioners within the United States Civil Service claiming
discrimination on the basis of race given in part, on reliance upon a written
test, “Test 21” which Black applicants disproportionately scored lower on,
thus precluding them from joining the police force.225
221
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Justice White made it clear that the law would not move even if a
“disproportionate impact” exposed as a harm to Black Americans was
proven in Court, as was the case here.226 Admitting that an “invidious
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of relevant
facts, including the fact [if true] that the law bears more heavily on one
race than another”227 the Court maintained indifference. Justice White
insisted upon an implausible new dichotomy: “discriminatory impact . . .
may [] demonstrate unconstitutionality because [] discrimination is very
difficult to explain on nonracial grounds” yet a law can still be found
“neutral on its face” satisfying the Equal Protection clause by use of the
new “sole purpose” test advanced in Washington v. Davis228. In short, it is
only when an action has no other purpose than to be intentionally and
solely discriminatory that the Court will accept racial matters as a valid
legal issue. If the 1960s was the zenith of advancing racial equality, how
could the Court have made such a turn that affects us to this day?

Questionable Context: Washington v. Davis’ Footnote Fourteen
The sole purpose test had teeth. On the fortieth anniversary of
Washington v. Davis, Professor Osagie K. Obasogie commented that
Davis is “a pivotal case on race and equality whose legacy has profoundly
shaped American race relations . . . and most people have never heard of
it.”229
In fact, the Davis opinion bursts with overt bias, concluding with a
decision by the Court to favor imbalance. The Davis Court was concerned
about more than the score of Black candidates on Test 21, the focus was
on societal balance generally, and what if anything considering race-based
harm would mean to those who benefitted from imbalances. Noting that
Title VII standards would have allowed for review of disparate impact, the
plaintiffs were victims of bad timing; the complaint was filed just before
Title VII protections were extended to Government employees.230 The
remaining constitutional claims would not protect these plaintiffs. Rather
than adopt the “more probing judicial review”, White attacked the ability
to analyze disparate impact — the stated concern was to not upset the
disparate benefit to others, stating that:
to hold a statute invalid [if it] benefits or burdens one race more than
another would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions about,
226
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and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor
and average black than to the more affluent white.231
It seems that the sole purpose of White’s opinion was intentional
discrimination, thus oddly satisfying his own “sole purpose” test and
warranting reexamination of Washington v. Davis.
Justice White had to offer supporting proof for something so damning.
Here, the Court relied on the burgeoning field of Law and Economics,
offering three articles presented as authority tucked into footnote 14. One
authority cited to was Harold Demsetz, “one of the greatest economists of
the Chicago School [of economic theory]”, and “one of the most creative
and deep microeconomists of the 20th century.”232 Demsetz’ article was
written one year after the passing of the Civil Rights Act, and the violence
broached in Brandenburg.233 Demsetz’ opening argument was that law is
incapable of changing the nature of discrimination as anti-discriminatory
legal constraints imposed on the market actually “penalize those in our
society who are discriminated against.”234 His elliptical claim that laws
against discrimination only hurt those who are discriminated against was
undone as Demsetz assured his readers that his use of the word
“discrimination” was not “be interpreted as a general condemnation” and
provided the following “proof” of the “useful role that can be played by
discrimination”
Because they are discriminated against, women who are plain and
overweight use the techniques of cosmetics, styling, diets, and exercise to
beautify themselves, and uneducated persons desirous of associating with
the educated find it advantageous to acquire more education. Only if we
are not ready to admit that beauty and education are characteristics to
which encouragement should be given can we claim that discrimination
serves no useful purposes. Indeed, although mistakes are often made as to
what are the ‘appropriate’ or ‘useful criteria upon which to discriminate,
there can be no doubt that discrimination is one of the strongest forces for
change in a free society. 235
231
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Demsetz only cited to his own opinion in this assertion, offering no
empirical data.236 The Court also relied on Demsetz’ argument regarding
the futility of equal-pay laws, if there is no discrimination by the employer
and wages are flattened, the “non-preferred” employees would be “forced
to seek less desirable employment” and suffer.237 Demsetz emphasized
that these non-preferred people include “plain women or physically
deformed persons as well as Jews or Negroes.”238 These brazen, biased
opinions were ushered into our current laws under the academic vogue for
law and economics, and gave reign to normative arguments advocating the
notion that discrimination is good, that harms simply befall certain groups
in Davis and beyond, and the futility and impracticability of doing
anything about discrimination and disparate impact.
Another article cited to in footnote 14 was authored by Frank I.
Goodman, a decorated lawyer serving as Director of Research for the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) during a
distinctly conservative turn — Richard Nixon was President, and Antonin
Scalia the newly named Chairman of ACUS.239 This conservative turn is
evident in that the enabling act for ACUS was signed into law by President
Lyndon B. Johnson one month after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.240 Johnson’s pick for the first chair of ACUS was Jerre S. Williams,
who as a professor of law at the University of Texas, volunteered to teach
Marion Sweatt, of Sweatt v. Painter, one of the famous school
desegregation cases leading to Brown v. Board of Education.241 All other
one thing for a beautiful, young, white, Protestant woman, as an aid to buying a better cut
of steak, to display her personal characteristics to a discriminating white, Protestant
butcher. It is quite another for a plain, old, Jewish, Negro woman to try the same tactic with
the same butcher.” Then claiming the lack of utility, arguing that such “plain, old” persons
should avoid that path and discover some other natural talent to proffer. Id. at 275
236
Id. at 272, n. 1.
237
Id. at 278.
238
Id. at 277. The author then offers that companies who do not discriminate may be
more profitable as “non-preferred workers” would work at “wages below the value of their
input.” However, employers “who earn smaller nominal returns because they discriminate
will earn nonmonetary returns in their increased consumption of preferable association.”
Essentially arguing, employers can still win, emerging as more elite, if they
discriminate . . . realizing nonmonetary returns in their increased consumption of
preferable [white, protestant] association
239
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law professors refused to teach Sweatt, despite the Supreme Court’s
decision to integrate the law school. Only Jerre Williams followed the
Supreme Court order.
Under Nixon, ACUS was different. Goodman’s paper advocates that
although de facto and de jure issues may have the same impact on groups,
and therefore do the same things, they are wholly different as legal
matters.242 It is Goodman’s work, and thus the work of the Federal
Government at the time, that permitted Justice White’s notion that
correcting de facto discriminatory impact was unnecessary.243 Goodman,
and the Court in citing this work, turned this into a moral position, the
objection to [a disproportionate impact rule] is not solely one of
practicality, but also one of principle.”244 The articulated principle was
legal callousness to Black people — “a man’s blackness does not exempt
him from neutral laws . . . [w]hy then should he be exempt solely because
[ disadvantaged by the law happen disproportionately to be black?”245
Goodman then offered the legal justification that “mere disproportionate
impact” is a form of “permitted de facto racial discrimination . . . familiar
in our constitutional jurisprudence.”246 Goodman’s argument that
“natural” imbalances do not invite judicial (or legislative) intervention was
based upon the goal of his paper, a debate on Brown v. Board and de facto
school segregation. Goodman concluded that the theory used in Brown that
“racial and socioeconomic imbalance [is] harmful” is based on a “highly
disputed empirical premise.”247
Goodman did not extend this logic to the professional realm, noting
“the baffling complexity [of] professional competence [was] “an area
where knowledge is still accumulating, values still in flux, and yesterday’s
wisdom very often today’s folly.”248 The Court went ahead and adopted
ACUS’ work to professional competence anyway, even after noting that
Congress had already extended Title VII protections to government
employees, which would have provided a different outcome in Davis.
Justice White forced a procedural opening to be more discriminatory than
242
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the ACUS authority in Footnote 14 advocated for, and gave space for
regression in racial discrimination despite Congress’ legislative move in
extending Title VII.
Further, Davis evoked emotions on race. Suspicion that Black people
are inherently flawed, and not the exam, were prevalent.249 Anger was too:
“American democracy . . . as we have known it” cannot withstand
“increasingly vociferous” demands for quotas; “wide-spread quota
imposition, not the overall American system, [will be] abandoned; poorly
educated [Blacks] are likely to be thrown back into the misery and want
from which they emerged, more bitter and volatile than before.”250 This
reads as pure animus, and is perhaps why Charles Lawrence III
commented that the economic nature of the Davis analysis, and White’s
reliance on “efficiency” — to move beyond a narrative of strictly racial
terms.251 By considering the “in-group and out-group in economic rather
than racial terms” provides a veneer that “unconscious racial attitudes
about race [did not] influence [] the governmental decision maker.”252
Lawrence’s comments on the unconscious operating in Davis is clear.
Almost no discussion is devoted to what the actual questions were in Test
21, and what if any logical connection there was to verbal skills, or police
skills. Upon review of the questions, was it possible that Black applicants
could have been disadvantaged at the time? A review of the questions on
Test 21 could have resolved much of the angry debate. Examples on the
test include the following two questions from Test 21:
“Laws restricting hunting to certain regions and to a specific time of
the year were passed chiefly:”
A) to prevent people from endangering their lives by hunting
B) keep our forests more beautiful
C) raise funds from the sale of hunting licenses
D) prevent complete destruction of certain kinds of animals
E) preserve certain game for eating purposes
“Although the types of buildings in ghetto areas vary from the onestory shack to the large tenement building, they are alike in that they are
all drab, unsanitary, in disrepair and often structurally unsound.” The
quotation best supports the statement that all buildings in ghetto areas are:
249

See Barbara Lerner, Washington v. Davis: Quantity, Quality, and Equality in
Employment Testing, 1976 S. CT. REV. 263.
250
Id. at 314.
251
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, And Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 365 (1987).
252
See id. at 365, 387 (concluding that the “workings of the unconscious make th[e]
dissonance between efforts to achieve full civil rights for Blacks and the self-interest of
those who are most able to effect change even more difficult to overcome”). Lawrence’s
analysis might explain commentary like Justice White’s, but the academic articles cited to
in Footnote 14 are more overt, on the offensive, and may go past the unconscious threshold.
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A) overcrowded
B) undesirable as living quarters
C) well-constructed
D) about to be torn down
E) seldom inspected253
The applicability of hunting to urban D.C. in the 1970s is slight if it
existed at all, and the disparaging question about “all” housing in “the
ghetto” being “drab” and “unsanitary” is offensive and degrading.254
Rather than presuming neutrality, the Court could have questioned the
validity of Test 21 along the lines of a simple rational review test, to decide
whether the questions bore a rational relationship to the role of a police
officer in Washington D.C. the 1970s, really did test the “verbal ability,
vocabulary, and reading and comprehension” targets for federal service
generally, and whether Test 21 questions established a “‘job relatedness’”
standard not just in line with the Civil Service Act of 1883 as offered in
support of the test, but applicable to life in 1976 when Davis was in front
of the Court.255
Those academic authorities supporting the Davis “sole purpose’ test
are outdated, lack empirical data, an insist on holding onto prejudicial
narratives that have no place in legal doctrine today. As related to key
findings by the Senate’s Intelligence Report in 2016 “no single group of
Americans was targeted by [Russian] information operatives more than
African-Americans.”256 Davis made that significant fact legally irrelevant,
and likely created the instinct in the Senate and in the Select Committee
on Intelligence to receive that information as not actionable; we see no
corresponding security recommendations in the Senate Recommendations
to combat the disparate impact, nor any corresponding charge in Mueller’s
Indictment. The “sole purpose” test in Davis has harmed Black people
long enough and has metastasized to and now harms us broadly in matters
of national security today.

McCleskey v. Kemp: Risks, Race, and Devolving Doctrine
While Davis solidified the notion that America would and should
function just fine using disparate impact to explain away discrimination,
factual integrity was also at issue. Davis relied upon dubious theories
loosely pulled from new field of Law and Economics and the vogue for
laissez-faire economics in the 1970’s that even at the time was challenged
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See id.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 236, n.4 (1976).
Sen. Intel. Rep., supra note 2, at 6.
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for being “insufficiently scientific.”257 This section focuses on the
interplay of fact, empirical data, and race in law as critical to
understanding how the extensive findings and data in the Senate
Intelligence Committee confirming that racial division was at the forefront
of the attacks and is a glaring vulnerability were reduced to irrelevance
legally.258
McCleskey v. Kemp finds a Black defendant disputing the
disproportionate punishment he faced in criminal sentencing.259
McCleskey went to the Court with highly regarded, new empirical data
demonstrating that he, as a Black defendant who shot and murdered a
white person was subject to far more severe punishment given the nexus
of those two racial data points.260 This case forced the Court, in their own
words, to consider “the most sophisticated [] analysis ever performed
[which] revealed that race more likely than not infects [judicial]
decisions.”261 The empirical data performed by a group of professors,
referred to as the “Baldus study”262 was considered very “sophisticated”
by the Court and analyzed 2,000 murder cases from Georgia during the
1970s, utilized 230 variables, and empirically revealed stark variances in
punishments when considering race of the victim and the defendant.263
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell opened the opinion by
accepting that this “complex statistical study [] indicates a risk that racial
considerations” affects capital punishments.264 The question was whether
this proved that McCleskey’s punishment was unconstitutional.265 The
Court also accepted that “Baldus [referring to the study] indicates that
Black defendants, such as McCleskey . . . have the greatest likelihood of
257

The Associated Press, Friedman Given A Nobel Award; 2 Share a Prize, N.Y. TIMES,
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The Baldus study was considered very “sophisticated” by the Court at that time and
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receiving the death penalty.”266 However, the Court still fell back into an
ahistorical approach by the end of the opinion — that the claims
surrounding the data “rest[ed] on the irrelevant factor of race [that] easily
could be extended to apply to claims based on unexplained
discrepancies.”267 This conclusion is incoherent — nothing can be
irrelevant if impact is proven empirically.
Powell went further to obviate race as a legal matter. He warned that
if race would be considered, there would be no limiting factor. All other
minorities would require consideration, as would gender, the “race or sex
of other actors in the criminal justice system, such as defense attorneys, or
judges” or “any arbitrary variable” like a “defendant’s facial
characteristics, or . . . physical attractiveness.”268 With race out of the way,
Powell argued that the Constitution did not warrant action as race was
merely equal to any other “potentially irrelevant factor,” and therefore the
Constitution does not require action for the resulting “demonstrable
disparities.”269 How racial impact was irrelevant despite “demonstrable
disparities” was not reckoned.
McCleskey therefore secured the perpetuation of racial disparities
even when the State had proof and an “awareness of consequences.”270
This disability haunts us today in the stunning void in the Senate
Intelligence Committee’s recommendations in the Russian Interference
Campaign. The overwhelming supporting facts that an international
adversary used racial provocations to upend our 2016 election and attack
our democracy broadly fell to the Davis and McCleskey logic.

The Race-Fact Disability at the Court
McCleskey presents three strong dissents by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens, admonishing the majority for repudiating “the
elaborate studies which the Court properly assumes to be valid.”271
The dissents all argue that the evidence was more than sufficient to
act. Justice Brennan’s dissent reinserted context and attacked the claim
that eye color or other features were equally “irrelevant” to legal matters
as it was not possible to contend that America “has on the basis of hair
color inflicted upon persons [the] deprivation comparable to that imposed
on the basis of race.”272 Further, history and context are not just narratives
— they matter for a proper analysis of statistical evidence. Ahistorical and
266
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acontextual claims “would require evidence of statistical correlation even
more powerful than that presented by the Baldus study.”273 To Brennan,
the Baldus study was unassailable, a fact he claimed the Court was not
equipped to challenge. The evidence of racial disparity was “uniquely
sophisticated” and by “far and away the most refined data ever assembled”
in that area of law.274 Brennan surmised that the Court simply “fail[ed] to
take account of the unprecedented refinement and strength of the Baldus
study” and reverted to bias and the willful ignorance in refusing to accept
legal considerations for racial disparity.
Justice Blackmun also admonished the Court for failing to consider
“evidence that establish[ed] a constitutionally intolerable level of racially
based discrimination.”275 Blackmun pointed to the majority’s inexplicably
shifting evidentiary standards. Use of the Baldus study was logical under
Batson v. Kentucky which had just lowered the burden of proof for a
defendant to meet for a prima facie case of “purposeful discrimination”
only one year prior.276 The Baldus study therefore presented “exhaustive
evidence” “that would have satisfied the [even] more burdensome
standard” the Court just struck down.277 There was simply no reason to
refuse the empirical data pointing to racial discrimination.
The Court vacillated on standards to apply to race-based questions,
evidence, and burden of proof requirements with dizzying speed. The
results of these slippery norms was laid bare in the Senate Intelligence
Report — the deep evidence of disparate impact offered with exacting
empirical data did not attach legally as the harms.
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V: CONCLUSION
Coming to Terms with Race and the Law — The Fierce Urgency of
Now
This paper was conceived before the January 6th, 2021, siege on the
Capitol. The facts presented in the Senate’s Intelligence Report that
inspired this paper should have spurred a review of Brandenburg given its
odd procedural posture, and the incredible conundrum that our nation was
simultaneously targeted through our broad, free speech protections and
impaired from acting due to the same free speech protections. Simply
noting how extensively race was used against our society and the absence
of any correlating recommendations or place in Mueller’s indictment
should have alerted to the imbalance our laws have created. Our nation
may be unrecognizable today to the founders for many reasons, but
certainly, our ambivalent treatment of a documented issue of national
security at the hands of a foreign entity fails the original purpose of our
union.
But the disability these cases imposed on our society are not
insurmountable. Brandenburg, Davis, and McCleskey laid beside their
corresponding history or authorities supporting those decision are
outmoded, based on questionable facts, such that further usage and
applicability can be questioned.
Finally, we cannot spend our way out of this threat. Russia’s annual
budget for these “Active Measures” was roughly fifteen million (USD)
versus the United States’ $582.7 billion (USD) military budget for 2017,
a mere 0.003% of our annual spending at the time.278 We have moved into
a new legal frontier that calls for a corresponding paradigm shift to ensure
basic elements of our national security are protected. We must finally
confront our weaknesses head on.
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